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DUKSUP: A Computer Program for High Thrust 
Launch Vehicle Trajectory Design and Optimization 
 
O. Frank Spurlock* and Craig H. Williams 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Glenn Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 44135 
 
Abstract* 
From the late 1960s through 1997, the leadership of NASA’s 
Intermediate and Large class unmanned expendable launch  
vehicle projects resided at the NASA Lewis (now Glenn)  
Research Center (LeRC). One of LeRC’s primary responsibili-
ties—trajectory design and performance analysis—was accom-
plished by an internally-developed analytic three dimensional 
computer program called DUKSUP. Because of its Calculus of 
Variations-based optimization routine, this code was generally 
more capable of finding optimal solutions than its contemporar-
ies. A derivation of optimal control using the Calculus of Vari-
ations is summarized including transversality, intermediate, and 
final conditions. The two point boundary value problem is ex-
plained. A brief summary of the code’s operation is provided, 
including iteration via the Newton-Raphson scheme and inte-
gration of variational and motion equations via a 4th order 
Runge-Kutta scheme. Main subroutines are discussed. The his-
tory of the LeRC trajectory design efforts in the early 1960s is 
explained within the context of supporting the Centaur upper 
stage program. How the code was constructed based on the op-
eration of the Atlas/Centaur launch vehicle, the limits of the 
computers of that era, the limits of the computer programming 
languages, and the missions it supported are discussed. The ve-
hicles DUKSUP supported (Atlas/Centaur, Titan/Centaur, and 
Shuttle/Centaur) are briefly described. The types of missions, 
including Earth orbital and interplanetary, are described. The 
roles of flight constraints and their impact on launch operations 
are detailed (such as jettisoning hardware on heating, Range 
Safety, ground station tracking, and elliptical parking orbits). 
The computer main frames on which the code was hosted are 
described. The applications of the code are detailed, including 
independent check of contractor analysis, benchmarking, lead-
ing edge analysis, and vehicle performance improvement as-
sessments. Several of DUKSUP’s many major impacts on 
launches are discussed including Intelsat, Voyager, Pioneer Ve-
nus, HEAO, Galileo, and Cassini.  
* Retired. 
Nomenclature 
C first integral of Euler-Lagrange equations  
E energy per unit mass 
F functional defined by Equation (3) 
G spherical Earth gravity constant 
J functional to be minimized 
N total number of stages 
S variational switching function 
T thrust 
e eccentricity 
f thrust direction 
g gravity acceleration 
h angular momentum per unit mass 
m mass 
r radius 
t time 
ν velocity 
x state variable 
z vector pointing at north pole 
β mass flow rate 
ε jump factor 
η fourth Lagrange multiplier 
λ first Lagrange multiplier 
μ second Lagrange multiplier 
σ third Lagrange multiplier 
 
Superscripts 
0 initial 
f final 
˙ time derivative 
ˆ unit vector 
 
Subscripts 
0 initial 
f final 
i,j,k,l,m,n stage numbers 
p perigee 
1, 2 components of oblate gravity acceleration 
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1.0 Introduction 
This paper is a history of the rationale for, the development 
of, and the use of, a trajectory analysis code called DUKSUP. 
It should be noted that it was very much a product of its time—
over 50 years ago. While there is limited utility in describing it 
in detail since at this point it is of historical interest largely to 
students of trajectory analysis and optimization. Thus, this pa-
per is not a “Users Guide”. There is value, however, in docu-
menting how such a product of largely one individual had such 
a profound and sustained impact on so many of this nation’s 
launches of spacecraft. Though largely unknown to those out-
side of the launch vehicle trajectory design and performance 
optimization community, it was relied upon by NASA manage-
ment to design the trajectories for most of the Atlas/Centaur, 
Titan/Centaur, and (anticipated) Shuttle/Centaur missions from 
the late 1960s until 1997 with the launch of the Cassini mission 
to Saturn. Originally written in FORTRAN IV, the only tech-
nical computer language available at that time, DUKSUP re-
tained that language’s coding through its lifetime. 
Because of its perceived value to the history of the NASA 
Lewis Research Center (LeRC) (now Glenn Research Center 
(GRC)), management included a hardcopy FORTRAN listing 
of the source code in the time capsule in front of the NASA 
GRC Administration Building 3; slated for opening in the year 
2041, 50 years after its sealing. 
2.0 Background 
The Atlas/Centaur rocket was transferred to LeRC in  
Cleveland, Ohio, in the fall of 1962 following the failure of its 
maiden flight (designated “F-1”) managed by the Marshall Space 
Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama. This took place 
within the backdrop of President Kennedy’s 1961 commitment 
to the United States landing a man on the Moon by the end of the 
decade. Werner von Braun and the MSFC were focused largely 
on responding to the challenge of building the launch vehicle to 
carry the crew to the Moon (Ref. 1). The responsibility for solv-
ing Atlas/Centaur problems was then transferred to LeRC, due in 
large part to the technical expertise and determination of Dr. Abe 
Silverstein. Centaur became known as “Abe’s Baby”. The sole 
mission of the Atlas/Centaur at that time was to get a soft lander 
(Surveyor) to the Moon prior to the attempt to land humans on 
the Moon. A project office was established at LeRC to manage 
the development of the vehicle. Within 14 months of the transfer 
of the Centaur program to LeRC, the problems were rectified and 
the first successful launch of an Atlas/Centaur launch vehicle 
(LeRC’s first attempt to launch an Atlas/Centaur), designated 
“AC-2,” occurred on November 27, 1963 (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.—Launch of Atlas/Centaur-2 
 
The LeRC was the Power, Propulsion, and Communication 
technology research center for NASA. LeRC did not have expe-
rience with large projects such as this and had to find the staff 
mostly from research groups to meet the challenge. In anticipa-
tion that the Russians would be first to land humans on the Moon 
due to the perceived lead that they had in the “race,” LeRC was 
doing the research on the propulsion for the vehicles to get to 
Mars. In 1961, a branch was created and staffed to provide the 
analytic resources to “guide” the research. Among the technolo-
gies being developed were a large hydrogen/oxygen engine, a 
large solid rocket motor, and a nuclear thermal rocket. Electric 
propulsion had been invented at LeRC and that research also con-
tinued. The analytic branch consisted of several sections that in-
cluded thermal, structural, nuclear, and performance analysis 
capability (later control analysis was added). This analytic capa-
bility was in place or under development when the responsibility 
for the Atlas/Centaur was transferred to LeRC. As stated earlier, 
the research divisions were “raided” to staff the new project of-
fice. Significant parts of the analytic capability were transferred 
to the project office to support the challenging schedule of land-
ing Surveyor on the Moon prior to the human landing attempt. At 
that point, the performance analysis capability was not as mature 
as the other disciplines and was left in the Propulsion Research 
Division until sometime later. 
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Initially, performance analysis for the Atlas/Centaur was 
done by the contractor, General Dynamics. For all practical pur-
poses, LeRC had no capability to do vehicle performance anal-
ysis and it had to be developed from codes developed for other 
purposes, such as low thrust trajectory analysis for electric pro-
pulsion missions to Mars and an N-Body code available at 
LeRC (Ref. 2). We1 scrambled to develop vehicle performance 
capability at LeRC. The analysis for the Surveyor mission was 
done virtually entirely by the contractor using capability devel-
oped to support the Atlas ICBM program. They had analyzed 
the Surveyor mission with the Centaur for several years.  
By the late 1960s, LeRC had developed the most sophisti-
cated mission analysis and mission design capability in NASA 
and perhaps in the United States. Obviously, we did not have 
access to what the classified world’s capabilities were. We were 
able to model the Centaur vehicles with such precision that post 
flight analysis verified performance capability to such accuracy 
that we could launch with minimal reserves. The trajectory de-
signs were such that we could maximize the payload weights 
available to the spacecraft to the desired orbits. This was partic-
ularly true for geostationary orbit (GSO) missions where pay-
load translated to profit or useful time on station.  
For the missions managed by LeRC, there evolved a philos-
ophy and capability committed to extracting all the potential 
payload mass available from flying these optimum trajectories. 
In addition to optimizing the trajectories, constraints, such as 
instantaneous heating, were explicitly incorporated into the op-
timization. Applying constraints optimally can lower technical 
risk while minimizing the impact on payload capability. Funda-
mentally, this paper documents the history of how the LeRC’s 
launch vehicle projects designed and flew the trajectories such 
that all the payload capability available from the vehicle was 
made available to the mission. 
3.0 Derivation of Optimum Control: 
the Calculus of Variations 
The following section outlines general mathematical theory 
on which DUKSUP was based. The Calculus of Variations 
(CoV) derivation as applied to this problem was previously 
published by the lead author (Ref. 3). The appendix to that pa-
per is included here for completeness. That derivation was the 
basis for the code. As new missions were added to the At-
las/Centaur manifest, the CoV analysis was extended to incor-
porate new requirements. 
1 The primary author uses “we” to indicate the core group of LeRC 
launch vehicle mission designers (and supporting management per-
sonnel) at the time of the event described. 
3.1 Why Calculus of Variations? 
The decision to take advantage of all of the potential payload 
capability obtainable from trajectory optimization for opera-
tional missions developed from the circumstances that existed 
when the Atlas/Centaur project came to LeRC in 1962. During 
the late fifties, LeRC was developing electric propulsion as a 
possible propulsion system for Mars missions. To obtain data 
to make informed technology decisions, the trajectory analysts 
used the CoV to construct a simple code. The computer availa-
ble at that time was an IBM 704, which had 8,000 36 bit words. 
Formulating a CoV solution was the only analytic technique 
that would obtain the data required and fit. In 1961 President 
Kennedy made the decision that the United States would beat 
the Russians to the Moon with humans. Had the Russians 
beaten us to the Moon, the U.S. planned to beat them to Mars. 
Consequently, two things happened at LeRC that affected ana-
lytic capability: (1) The Atlas/Centaur Project came to LeRC to 
support the Surveyor project to soft land robotic spacecraft on 
the Moon as precursors to human landings, and (2) Research on 
very large propulsion systems was being conducted in case it 
were needed to build the launch vehicles to send humans to 
Mars. The simplest analytic technique for such problems is to 
use methods known as steepest descent to maximize the pay-
load to the desired state. That approach solved the optimization 
problem by iterating on initial conditions to maximize the pay-
load consistent with the desired end conditions. But the com-
puters available in 1962 were too small and too slow to 
implement such a technique. Of necessity, the analysts re-
sponded by developing CoV launch vehicle trajectory codes to 
support the LeRC technology groups working on large engines. 
Different CoV codes were developed to support the Atlas/Cen-
taur project, whose only mission at that time was Surveyor. 
There were no commercially available codes; all had to be de-
veloped in-house. Serendipitously, being forced to use the CoV 
taught the analysts a great deal about the nature of optimum so-
lutions for launch vehicle trajectory problems. Such insight is 
not readily available from steepest descent techniques. The 
CoV theory showed that optimum solutions maximizing pay-
load are characterized by continuous thrust vectors, unless a 
constraint is imposed, in which case the thrust vectors are dis-
continuous. Initially, analysts had not learned how to impose 
constraints. It soon became apparent that the CoV technique 
yielded the maximum payload to orbit to within about one hun-
dredth of a pound. This was verified by obtaining parametric 
data. We also learned the level of fidelity of vehicle models re-
quired to predict payload accurately. A fairly simple, three di-
mensional (3D) model was all that was required to accurately 
predict payload, and to design the trajectories that would yield 
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that payload. Very detailed post-flight trajectory reconstruc-
tions of early Atlas/Centaur flights verified the results of the 
simplified modeling and the optimization. 
3.2 Problem Setup 
The optimization of a trajectory to a circular synchronous 
equatorial orbit may be considered as the problem of optimizing 
a multistage launch vehicle to a particular final orbit. The opti-
mization problem to be considered here begins at booster jetti-
son, which is assumed to be a fixed position and velocity. The 
sustainer portion of the Atlas continues until propellant deple-
tion. The sustainer is jettisoned and a few seconds later the first 
Centaur burn begins. Its duration is variable and must be opti-
mized. The perigee radius of the parking orbit is fixed. The du-
ration of the parking orbit coast may or may not be optimized. 
The parking orbit is not a true coast since a small acceleration 
is maintained for propellant retention. The duration and direc-
tion of the second Centaur burn must be optimized, followed by 
an optimum transfer orbit coast (a true coast), and a final burn 
of fixed total impulse. The analysis presented here to solve this 
problem is a special case of the analysis derived in a prior work 
by the author (Ref. 4), with an additional constraint—parking 
orbit perigee radius. 
The variational problem to be solved is to find the steering 
program and various stage durations which maximize the pay-
load capability of a multistage launch vehicle to a specified fi-
nal orbit. The trajectory must satisfy certain initial, final, and 
intermediate conditions on the state variables. The thrust, pro-
pellant flow rate, and jettison weight for each stage are assumed 
to be constant. The equations of motion and constraints for each 
stage may be written as 
 0ˆ)( =−− mfTirgv  (1a) 
 0=− vr  (1b) 
 0=β+ im  (1c) 
 01ˆˆ =−⋅ ff  (1d) 
where fˆ  is the unit thrust direction and g(r) is the oblate Earth 
gravity acceleration, which may also be written 
 zzrgrzrg ˆ)ˆ,(ˆ)ˆ,()( 21 ⋅+⋅= rrrg  (2) 
Suppose that each stage of the vehicle is numbered consecu-
tively starting with the booster. For analysis purposes a stage 
change occurs when the thrust and/or propellant flow rate 
changes and/or a mass is jettisoned. A Bolza formulation of the 
variational problem is used, and the functional to be minimized 
is written in an earlier source (Ref. 4) as 
 dtFmJ
N
i
t
t if
i
i
∑∫
= −
+−=
2 1
 (3) 
where the functional Fi for each stage is 
 [ ] [ ]
( ) ( )1ˆˆ
/ˆ
−⋅η+β+σ+
−⋅+−−⋅=
ffm
mfTF
i
ii

 vrμgvλ  (4) 
The resulting Euler-Lagrange equations are 
 0μλ =+  (5a) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0ˆ/ˆˆˆ 2111 =∇⋅+⋅−∇⋅++ gzrrrggrrg rr λλλλμ  (5b) 
 ( ) 0ˆ2 =⋅−σ fmTi λ  (5c) 
 ( ) 0λ =−η mTf iˆ2  (5d) 
The optimum thrust direction fˆ  is obtained by combining 
Equations (1d) and (5d) and using the Weierstrass E-test. This 
procedure results in 
 λ= ˆfˆ  (6) 
Since F does not explicitly depend on time, an integral of the 
motion is 
 ( ) 0=σβ−λ+⋅+⋅+ ii mTC vμgλ  (7) 
When a spherical gravity model is assumed (i.e., g(r) = G/r3 
ȓ), three additional integrals of the motion exist which are given 
by λ × v + μ × r = const. Since, λ, μ, r, and v are all continuous 
except where an intermediate boundary condition is imposed 
(as will be shown later), the three integrals are constant across 
staging points where continuity holds. However for the oblate 
gravity model used in this analysis, only a single component of 
the previous vector integral is constant, as can be verified by 
differentiation with respect to time. 
 ( ) zˆ⋅×+× rμvλ  = const (8) 
3.3 Transversality Equation 
The transversality equation for this problem is 
 ( )∑
=
− −σ+⋅+⋅+=
N
i
f
t
i dmtdmddCdtdJ i
2
1rμvλ  (9) 
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which is set equal to zero for an optimal solution. An earlier 
source (Ref. 4) shows that: 
 
• λ and μ are continuous everywhere if there are no inter-
mediate boundary conditions. If the intermediate bound-
ary condition (assumed to occur at a staging point) is 
expressed as  
 0desired, =− pp rr  (10) 
A previous source (Ref. 5) shows that the discontinuities 
in λ and μ are ε∇vrp and ε∇rrp, respectively. The variable 
ε is used as an initial condition in the two-point boundary 
value problem to satisfy the intermediate boundary con-
dition Equation (10). 
• The equations that must be satisfied to optimize the dura-
tion of the powered and coast stages are derived in a 
previous source (Ref. 4), and the applicable results are 
presented here. Let j be the first optimized powered 
stage. Then for constant jettison weight the equation 
for optimizing stage l is 
 ( )∑
−
=
+ =−
1
0
1 0
l
ji
i
f
i SS  (11) 
where 0 and f refer to initial and final values and the S 
functions are defined as 
 ( )[ ]( )iiii mTCS βλ+⋅+⋅−=σ−β= 1vμgλ  (12a) 
 0,0 =β≡ iiS  (12b) 
where the right side of Equation (12a) is obtained by us-
ing Equation (7) (note: βi ≠ 0). For coasting stages  
(βi = Ti = 0) to be optimized, the equation 
 ( ) 0=⋅+⋅= vμgλiC  (13) 
must be satisfied for maximum payload. 
• For free initial or final state variable x, the required or fi-
nal condition for maximum payload is given from a pre-
vious publication as (Ref. 6) 
 ( ) ( ) 0// =∂∂⋅+∂∂⋅ xx ruvλ  (14) 
If the initial position and velocity are specified, the initial val-
ues of any five of the six λ and μ and may be used as variable 
initial conditions in order to satisfy the required final conditions 
of the two-point boundary value problem. In order to eliminate 
the difficulty associated with guessing at values of the multipli-
ers, the values of λ and μ may be used as variable initial condi-
tions in order to satisfy the required final conditions of the two-
point boundary value problem. In order to eliminate the diffi-
culty associated with guessing at values of the multipliers, the 
values of λ and μ can be expressed in terms of pitch and yaw 
attitudes and their time rates of change. These equations may 
be found in a previous publication (Ref. 6). The values of λ and 
μ are then calculated from: 
 λλ= ˆλ  (15a) 
 λλ−λλ−= ˆˆ μ  (15b) 
The value of λ can be set equal to unity without loss of gener-
ality. The initial value of λ  can be calculated in closed form, as 
will be shown by the following development. 
3.4 Final Conditions 
Final conditions for both the conventional and unconven-
tional synchronous equatorial orbit mission require a circular 
orbit at synchronous orbit altitude with prescribed inclination. 
If the required inclination is nonzero, both the longitude of the 
ascending node and the injection point in the final orbit are free 
for optimization. As shown in a previous publication (Ref. 6), 
the corresponding auxiliary variational final conditions are 
 ( ) 0ˆ =⋅×+× zrμvλ  (16a) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) 0vrrμvλ =×⋅×+×  (16b) 
If the desired inclination is zero, Equations (16a) and (16b) 
degenerate into one equation (zero inclination is equivalent to 
two final conditions, 0ˆ =⋅ zr  and 0ˆ =⋅ zv , and only Equa-
tion (16a) must be satisfied. 
Since Equation (16a) is a constant of the motion Equation (8), 
it may be satisfied at the beginning of the trajectory, and used 
to calculate λ . However, it must first be verified that jump dis-
continuities in λ and μ at the intermediate boundary point do 
not change the value of the constant. This requires that 
 ( ) 0rv rv =⋅×∇+×∇ zrr pp ˆ  (17) 
It will be shown later than Eq. (17) is satisfied. 
The calculation of λ  proceeds as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0ˆˆˆˆˆλˆ =⋅×λλ−⋅×λλ−⋅×λ=⋅×+× zzzz rrvrμvλ   (18a) 
 ( )[ ]zz ⋅×λ⋅



 ×λ−×λλ=λ rrv ˆ/ˆˆˆ   (18b) 
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Computing λ  with Equation (18b) guarantees that Equa-
tion (16a) will be satisfied. 
3.5 Intermediate Conditions 
As explained earlier, it is necessary to constrain the perigee 
radius at injection into the first parking orbit. Otherwise, the 
optimum solution would result in the parking orbit injection 
and/or the equator crossing occurring at very low altitudes, thus, 
violating spacecraft heating constraints. Therefore, the interme-
diate constraint is given by Equation (10), where the desired 
value corresponds to the perigee altitude. 
The required gradients are calculated to be (where e is the 
orbital eccentricity): 
 ( ) eGrhhr pp vrv 2ˆ −×=∇  (19a) 
 ( )( ) ( )[ ]( )errhGhr pp 1ˆ/ 22rvr −×=∇  (19b) 
It is easily shown that Equation (17) is satisfied for the  
gradients in Equations (19a) and (19b). Hence the value of λ × v 
+ μ × r is unaffected by the jump in λ and μ. 
3.6 Boundary Value Problem 
For the GSO missions, both fixed and optimum parking orbit 
coast time were considered. The transfer orbit coast time was 
always optimized, however, along with the durations of the first 
and second Centaur burns. Based on the preceding discussion 
of the transversality equation, the initial and final conditions for 
the two point boundary value problem (2PBVP) are shown in 
Table 1 for the case where the parking orbit coast time was op-
timized. 
If the desired final inclination is nonzero, then ( )zˆ⋅r  and 
( ) 0=′⋅ zv  are replaced by idesired and ( ) ( ) 0=×⋅×+× vrvλrμ . 
If the parking orbit coast time is fixed, then an initial and final 
condition is removed. These are tk and  
 ( )∑
−
=
+−
1
10
k
ji
i
f
i SS  = 0 (20) 
It should be recognized that there may be any number of fixed 
stages between tj and tk, etc. Also, the last three final conditions 
are evaluated at intermediate points in the trajectory. 
4.0 Two Point Boundary Value Problem 
The following technique was devised to systematically pro-
ceed from a simple, easily converged problem to the solution of 
the two point boundary value problem (2PBVP) for a circular 
synchronous equatorial orbit.  
TABLE 1.—INITIAL AND FINAL CONDITIONS FOR 2PBVP 
Initial conditions Final conditions 
Pitch attitude Energy/unit mass 
Pitch attitude desiredr  
Yaw attitude desiredr  
Yaw attitude rate 
desired,pr  
ε (jump factor) ( ) 0ˆ =• zr  
tj (1st Centaur burn) ( ) 0ˆ =• zv  
tk (park orbit coast) ( )∑
−
=
+ =−
1
0
1 0
k
ji
i
f
i SS  
tl (2nd Centaur burn) ( )∑
−
=
+ =−
1
0
1 0
l
ji
i
f
i SS  
tm (transfer orbit coast) ( ) 0=⋅µ+⋅λ= vgCi  
 
A trajectory is obtained to a slightly elliptical (parking) orbit 
with the desired perigee radius without plane change with a 90° 
launch azimuth. This problem converges easily. Then the ascent 
burn time is fixed at the value obtained and a variable length 
parking orbit coast, a fixed parking orbit perigee radius and sec-
ond burn are added. This problem is targeted to the desired ap-
ogee and 180° argument of perigee for first equator crossing 
second burn. An inclination decrease of about 2° is then added 
to these final conditions and the problem is retargeted to the 
augmented final conditions. Now the transfer orbit coast (vari-
able) and apogee burn (fixed or variable) are added. This trajec-
tory is integrated to the end with the converged initial guesses 
from the last step. The final conditions achieved will frequently 
be far from a circular synchronous equatorial orbit. However, 
specify the final conditions actually achieved as the desired 
ones, and optimize the problem. The parking orbit coast, second 
burn, and transfer orbit coast durations will change. Now alter 
the achieved final conditions toward the desired ones judi-
ciously in steps, retargeting at each step. In this manner, the de-
sired final orbit conditions may be obtained. Now the ascent 
burn duration may be optimized. Any sizable change in a con-
straint or final condition is best achieved by proceeding in steps. 
The problem is quite nonlinear. Attempts to plot initial condi-
tions as functions of the final conditions for extrapolation pur-
poses were made. They were generally unsuccessful. 
The most challenging aspect was solving the two point bound-
ary value problem. In the worst case, there were 18 initial condi-
tions to satisfy 18 final conditions. The problem was highly 
nonlinear and to achieve convergence, very accurate derivatives 
were necessary. We never encountered problems that we couldn’t 
converge, but “sneaking” up on the solutions was mandatory. Ex-
perience was of great value in formulating a strategy for achiev-
ing convergence. It usually involved converging a problem that 
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was “easy” and adding complexity to the problem and proceed-
ing step-by-sometimes small step to get a solution. If a converged 
solution to a similar problem were available, it was possible to 
“move” in small steps to converge the new problem. As faster 
and faster machines became available, these techniques and/or 
strategies became less of a handicap. However, when we had the 
slower machines, we achieved convergence, but the computer 
time required reduced productivity.  
However, at the beginning with the small and slow machine 
we had to work with, the CoV/two point value problem tech-
nique was faster and the machine size limitation less onerous. 
Steepest descent techniques were slower and more of a problem 
with the small computer. A series type technique very quickly 
swamped the machine. 
A problem with any technique is avoiding local maxima. The 
larger the number of independent variables, the probability of 
settling on a local maximum is higher. This is probably much 
higher with a steepest descent technique because the hyper-
space is so large and complex. The CoV has many fewer initial 
variables and the hyper-space is not nearly so complex. Local 
maxima are obtainable with the CoV; in fact, it is not hard to 
select initial conditions which lead to those locals. Since the 
problems are so hard to converge and good initial “guesses” so 
important to have any chance of convergence, locals are not 
usually a problem. A few cases were encountered where a local 
was so close to a global that the problem converged to the local. 
These can usually be identified by examining the solution and 
from experience, deducing that it is, in fact, a local that has been 
identified. And usually, the payload capabilities are only a few 
pounds different. If the solution was obtained by “sneaking up” 
on the solution and if the initial conditions in the “sneak” attack 
are plotted, often there is a discontinuity which suggests that a 
local optimum has been encountered. In “esoteric” problems 
(such as the HEAO trajectory, Sec. 11.7) it was important to 
plot the evolving trajectory characteristics and to “reason” that 
from energy considerations, the solution was almost certainly a 
global. It was not unusual to have the CoV “discover” a solution 
that was counterintuitive. After hand plotting trajectory charac-
teristics and the variation in initial conditions, it was possible to 
understand the “tradeoffs” the calculus had made. 
5.0 DUKSUP 
5.1 Early NASA LeRC Trajectory Design 
Code Development 
LeRC had never analyzed launch trajectories prior to the 
transfer of the Centaur Program. It had, however, studied inter-
planetary trajectories. Art Zimmerman had developed a com-
puter code in polar coordinates based on the calculus of 
variations to study low-thrust electric propulsion research  
options (Ref. 7). That code gave us our first exposure to  
trajectory optimization using the calculus of variations. By re-
placing the gravitational constant of the Sun with that of the 
Earth, we could use the code to analyze launch trajectories after 
the vehicle had left the atmosphere. We had no code to simulate 
the atmospheric portion of the trajectory. Due to bending loads 
and atmospheric heating, launch vehicle trajectories are near 
zero-angle-of-attack in critical periods until the vehicle leaves 
the atmosphere. Until we could develop a digital capability, we 
simulated the atmospheric portion of a trajectory on an analog 
computer and fed the state vector from that part of the “flight” 
into the simple jury rigged version of the available low thrust 
code. While using this “primitive” technique temporarily, we 
were taking parts of the N-Body code (Ref. 2), replacing the 
gravitational constant of the Sun with that of the Earth, and cob-
bling together a digital code to “fly” the atmospheric portion of 
the trajectory. We then took the state vector from the digital re-
placement and manually input it into the low-thrust code. This 
was a cumbersome at best, temporary solution to analyzing the 
performance of multi-stage vehicles. The goal was to be able to 
maximize the payload (not the burn-out weight) capability of 
four or five stage vehicles where the last stage could be nuclear 
thermal. In the 1960s, it was assumed that we could use a nu-
clear thermal rocket in the atmosphere—so the last stage was 
sometimes nuclear thermal. We also assumed that we could “re-
light” the last stage after a coast to put it on an interplanetary 
trajectory, usually to Mars.  
To perform the analyses to support the rapidly expanding 
needs of the Propulsion Research Division, a new code was 
needed to quickly assess the payload impact of technology op-
tions for engines, both liquid and solid. Still using the polar coor-
dinate calculus of variations formulation of the problem, Fred 
Teren derived the equations for optimizing five stages where the 
jettisoned stage weight of each stage was a linear function of the 
propellant “burned” by that stage. That included the last stage, 
where the payload was the burnout weight minus the stage 
weight. This code was developed, documented, and provided to 
the community prior to the development of DUKSUP. Its lessons 
learned heavily influenced the design of DUKSUP. One of the 
challenges with the earlier code was the difficulty in converging 
the two-point boundary value problem (see Sec. 4.0) inherent in 
the calculus of variations formulation. The partial derivatives re-
quired were obtained by perturbing each of the initial conditions 
and obtaining the differences between the perturbed cases and the 
nominal. It was soon apparent that the perturbation size had an 
enormous effect on the “accuracy” of the partial derivatives (re-
ally secants). A scheme was incorporated which assessed “accu-
racy” and adjusted the perturbation size to obtain partial 
derivatives that were sufficiently accurate to permit convergence. 
This scheme worked but was clumsy and somewhat arbitrary. 
But obtaining analytical partials was initially thought impractical 
and would probably make the code so large it could not fit on 
core. Segmenting the code was possible, but would make it so 
slow that it would approach the unusable. 
From the experience Fred Teren and I gained from our initial 
development of codes designed to support the Propulsion Re-
search Division, we knew that we had to obtain analytic partial 
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derivatives or converging a large two point boundary problem 
would prove very difficult if not impossible. This challenge was 
twofold. Derivation of the equations for calculating these deriv-
atives was necessary (they had to be right) and incorporating 
them into a code (correctly) was the second challenge. We also 
could not be sure that all of this new code would “fit” onto our 
small machine until we tried it, because we could not be sure of 
how the compiler would proceed. In addition, these derivatives 
had to be checked for correctness, otherwise the solution of the 
two point boundary value problem would difficult if not impos-
sible. These were checked for calculating “partials” by varying 
initial conditions slightly and calculating the resulting “secant” 
partials. This was a laborious and time consuming process as 
there were inevitable errors both in the derivations and the cod-
ing. But the errors were found and corrected. 
5.2 DUKSUP: A New Code for a New  
Centaur Mission 
When the Atlas/Centaur was assigned to LeRC in the fall of 
1962, it had only the one mission assigned to it—the Surveyor 
mission to soft land the first U.S. spacecraft on the Moon in 
support of the human landing to follow. These launches took 
place between June 1966 and January 1968. Centaur’s manu-
facturer General Dynamics did the trajectory analysis for the 
Surveyor missions, as LeRC’s capability was not yet in place. 
General Dynamics had been performing trajectory design sup-
porting the Centaur program from the start, after having done 
suborbital ballistic analysis for the Atlas as far back as the in-
ception of that program in 1955. But by the mid-1960s a new 
class of missions were being planned for Atlas/Centaur. These 
were GSO missions, characterized by two coast periods—a rel-
atively short one (~ 15 min) to the equator and the other longer 
one (~ 5¼ hr) from low Earth orbit (LEO) to geostationary alti-
tude—punctuated by two Centaur burns. The trajectories were 
not planar, so a 3D formulation of the problem was required. 
They were to be the first missions that LeRC analyzed, and they 
were more complex, and of much longer duration than the lunar 
missions or any other interplanetary launch. DUKSUP was de-
veloped to perform the trajectory design and performance anal-
ysis for those missions. 
These missions were initially handled by LeRC and General 
Dynamics as two separate optimization problems. The first tar-
get was to get the Centaur and payload into a parking orbit, 
90 nmi altitude circular, followed by a coast, then a second tar-
get to a transfer coast to GSO. From this, the change in velocity 
(ΔV) to injection into the final orbit could be calculated and the 
size of the spacecraft’s solid motor determined. This was a la-
borious, awkward process, obviously not optimum. That is to 
say, more payload could be obtained if the trajectory could be 
optimized from liftoff to injection into the final GSO. It was 
also obvious to us that optimizing the launch trajectory (that is, 
getting all of the payload capability from the launch vehicle) 
was the cheapest and most reliable means of increasing payload 
 
 
Figure 2.—Launch of Advanced Technology Satellite (AC-17) 
 
over the piecemeal technique which was currently in use. The 
challenge was to develop a code that could maximize payload 
to a desired GSO within less than 1 lb. This goal was suggested 
by the economics of geostationary spacecraft. Adding as much 
as 5 lb could significantly increase the life time of the space-
craft, thus generating significantly more revenue. 
One of the first of these new, other-than lunar missions in the 
mid-1960s for Atlas/Centaur was the Advanced Technology 
Satellite (ATS), first launched in August 1968 (see Figure 2 
AC-17 launch). ATS was a GSO mission that had “out-grown” 
its original launch vehicle. Before new trajectory tools could be 
constructed and after closed-form approximate solutions were 
obtained, we were forced to try to maximize the payload “piece-
meal,” i.e., optimizing parts of the trajectory sequentially, and 
then “hooking” them together. We then iterated “manually” to 
try to find the maximum payload for a mission profile which 
required two ignitions of the Centaur main engines, followed 
by a burn of the spacecraft solid motor (Ref. 8). There were two 
coast periods, with the first about 20 min between the Centaur 
burns (to near the equator), and the second after the Centaur 
second burn. The spacecraft then separated from Centaur and 
coasted for a 5½ hr period to geostationary altitude, culminating 
in the burn of the spacecraft solid motor at apogee. This motor, 
integral to the spacecraft, had fixed total impulse to circularize 
the orbit and reduce orbit inclination to near-zero. The Centaur 
burns were primarily in-plane, while the circularization burn an 
apogee of the transfer orbit performed most of the plane change. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the in-plane and out-of-plane 
views of the geostationary mission. 
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Figure 3.—Geostationary Mission (In-Plane) 
(Drawn to scale unless noted) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.—Geostationary Mission (Out-of-Plane) 
(Drawn to scale unless noted) 
 
Soon after, we were also asked to launch Intelsat GSO mis-
sions, which were similar to ATS missions, except that the 
spacecraft solid motors were not yet selected and the total im-
pulses of those motors could still be optimized. “Piece-meal” 
optimization of these trajectories to yield maximum payload to 
GSO was nearly impossible because of the very large number 
of variables. There was also enormous pressure to optimize the 
trajectories to yield maximum payload. This was unlike the 
ATS case, where only enough extra launch vehicle capability 
was needed to match the solid motor total impulse. For the com-
mercial Intelsat missions, any extra payload to GSO could be 
used to add capability to the spacecraft, or provide extra propel-
lant to the stationkeeping tanks. This extra propellant could add 
months or years to orbit lifetime, which was highly desirable 
because spacecraft lifetime was directly related to revenue.  
It was not clear that an Atlas/Centaur code with the desired 
precision was possible on the small, slow computer available to 
us. Abandoning the calculus of variations was considered. At 
first, using a steepest descent technique was considered, but this 
was discarded when it became clear that this technique would be 
much slower than the calculus of variations. Each of the variables 
would require a separate trajectory to utilize such a technique. 
The accuracy of such a technique was unknown and capturing a 
misleading local (not global) maximum was considered a real 
possibility. The calculus of variations formulation also had a 
known risk of local maxima, but the threat seemed more manage-
able. An infinite series approach to the problem was also tried, 
but it soon swamped the machine and for our era, seemed imprac-
tical if not impossible. This technique would probably have 
worked with a simple optimization problem, but it did not work 
with the complexity of the model required to analyze our prob-
lem. So the calculus of variations formulation was rederived in 
spherical coordinates in the belief that the numerical integration 
of the coast periods would open up the numerical integration step 
size and reduce the computer time required per problem. It did, 
but the spherical coordinate formulation increased the size of the 
code and did not lend itself to facilitating FORTRAN do-loops. 
Thus, it was concluded to formulate the CoV problem in rectan-
gular coordinates which did lend itself to the use of “do-loops,” 
reducing code size. In retrospect, this last decision with the re-
sulting derivations and coding represented the first version of 
what would be called DUKSUP. 
Consequently, the CoV-based DUKSUP code was written 
which optimized the GSO trajectories from liftoff to injection 
into GSO (Ref. 8). To our knowledge, no one had attempted to 
do that before. This meant not only optimizing the trajectory 
“path,” but also optimizing the duration of the Centaur burns 
(the sum of the burn times being a constant dictated by the max-
imum propellant load of the Centaur), the durations of the two 
coasts, and in the case of the Intelsat missions, the total impulse 
of the spacecraft solid motor. This proved to be a formidable 
task. Three problems had to be overcome immediately (Ref. 8). 
The first problem was that the CoV technique required the so-
lution of a multi-variable two-point boundary value problem—
that is, it was necessary to vary initial conditions until final con-
ditions were satisfied. The second problem was that to obtain 
optimum solutions for such a long-duration mission (covering 
a travel arc of about 180° for the transfer orbit coast), it was 
necessary to include the first harmonic of the Earth’s oblateness 
in the CoV formulation. Ignoring the first harmonic was 
demonstrated to yield nonoptimum solutions. The third prob-
lem was that intermediate constraints had to be imposed explic-
itly in the CoV formulation to model the problem. Specifically, 
the altitude of the parking orbit had to be constrained to at least 
an acceptable value, else the trajectories would unacceptably 
“dip” during the first coast. 
To address the first problem, up to this point, we had obtained 
the derivatives to solve the two-point boundary value problem 
using perturbed trajectories. This had been a cumbersome but 
simple and adequate technique for the relatively short duration 
problems we had solved earlier. However, for these long dura-
tion, complicated problems with near circular parking orbits, 
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we had to derive and code equations to obtain analytic deriva-
tives to get solutions. 
For the second problem, it turned out that including the first 
harmonic of the oblateness in the CoV solution was feasible, 
and easy, and did not really complicate the formulation. Includ-
ing the first harmonic eliminated nonoptimum solutions. By ig-
noring the harmonic and comparing that trajectory with one 
including it, we demonstrated that for such a long duration and 
arc, the harmonic had a significant effect on the trajectory. As 
will be discussed later, understanding the effects of the har-
monic on trajectories provided valuable experience in rendez-
vous and round trip problems, enabling the code to be modified 
to accommodate space-tug missions. 
The third problem introduced the challenge of imposing con-
straints in the middle of a trajectory, specifically to limit the per-
igee altitude of the parking orbit such that the trajectory would 
not dip back into the sensible atmosphere, which it would do “op-
timally.” Our first solution to the problem was to force the Cen-
taur first burn to “target” to a circular parking orbit at a specified 
altitude. Due to oblateness, the orbit did not stay perfectly circu-
lar, but close. We were able to obtain solutions for both the ATS 
and Intelsat missions. For Intelsat, the entire mission was opti-
mized from liftoff to apogee motor burnout, resulting in maxi-
mum payload to GSO (verified by perturbation). In particular, the 
amount of plane change performed by the Centaur second burn 
was optimized (about ~2°). Circularization and the final plane 
change at GSO were performed by an optimally sized solid motor 
on the spacecraft. As mentioned earlier for ATS, the desired 
spacecraft weight had grown, and the original launch vehicle was 
no longer able to place the heavier spacecraft in the desired geo-
stationary transfer orbit. The apogee motor was too small, having 
been sized for a lower payload and a less capable launch vehicle. 
Therefore, the Atlas/Centaur had to reduce the ∆V required of the 
fixed total impulse motor to match the ∆V required for the de-
sired final maneuver into GSO. A solution was obtained at apo-
gee by decreasing the inclination to be removed by the apogee 
motor and increasing the inclination to be removed by the Cen-
taur second burn. Later, we would further examine the trajectory 
design and realize that there was a better solution; namely, the 
perigee of the transfer orbit could also be raised to lower the in-
plane ∆V required at apogee. But this meant that the parking orbit 
was no longer near-circular, but instead would be elliptical. The 
solution that would maximize the payload in the final orbit would 
reduce the ∆V at apogee by reducing the inclination change re-
quired of the apogee motor, and also reduce the ∆V to circularize 
the orbit by raising the perigee altitude of the transfer orbit. The 
optimum combination of these two maneuvers would yield the 
maximum final payload.  
Optimizing the problem from liftoff until injection into GSO 
meant that the optimization was one problem, not two or more. 
That introduced intermediate boundary conditions at injection 
into the parking orbit—initially three: energy, radius, and flight 
path angle. If properly calculated, these three conditions (these 
were not the only three) would deliver a circular orbit with an 
optimum inclination and node. But these intermediate boundary 
conditions introduced discontinuities in the adjoint equations 
and their derivatives. Each of them introduced a discontinuity 
which had to be calculated, accompanied by an additional initial 
variable to be added to the two point boundary value problem. 
Beyond that, optimum duration burns and coasts introduced 
other equations that had to be satisfied for optimality. These, 
too, introduced more initial variables and final conditions that 
added to the two point boundary value problem. 
As these capabilities were added to the code, the optimality 
of the result was checked parametrically. That is, the code de-
termined an optimum value to the first burn of the Centaur. The 
code was flexible enough to allow us to fix the duration of the 
first burn and vary it around the “optimum” value. We found 
that the “optimum” was not the optimum. We had assumed that 
it would not be necessary to include oblateness in the derivation 
of the variational equations. Including the first harmonic of the 
oblateness model did not add significantly to the complexity or 
length of the code, so it was included. With that addition, the 
“optimum” was determined to be the optimum within less than 
two-tenths of a pound. This amazed us, because we had no idea 
what to expect from the theory or the code. On reflection, it 
should not have been surprising, since the modeling was simple 
and did not introduce “noise” into the application of the theory. 
In summary: DUKSUP was designed to optimize the thrust 
direction consistent with constraints, the duration of burn times 
that were free for optimization, and to optimize the intermediate 
and final injection orbit elements that were not specified to 
maximize the payload available to the spacecraft. We pursued 
the goal of extracting every bit of payload for any mission that 
could be obtained from by optimizing the trajectory and mission 
design. If the vehicle could provide more payload than needed 
by the spacecraft, the excess capability was used to improve 
range safely or to provide the spacecraft with better telemetry 
coverage, etc. We had enough confidence in the reliability of 
the vehicle that we strived to make available to the mission the 
benefit of using all the launch vehicle propellant.  
5.3 Limitations of FORTRAN and Its Impacts 
FORTRAN was the only scientific and engineering program-
ming language available to us. It was not yet standardized (still 
in the process of development by the computer systems group) 
and thus was not dependable. Codes would compile one day but 
frequently not the next. Sometimes they would compile but 
would crash. The systems group was usually busy and often not 
able to help us debug. It was not unusual to have weeks go by 
without being able to move forward because of such problems. 
The only way at the time to debug a program was to dump (octal 
dump) the core of the computer and look at the machine lan-
guage to determine exactly what the compiler had done with the 
FORTRAN. In self-defense we learned to “read” the octal 
dumps and understand exactly what the machine was doing. It 
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was common in a large FORTRAN “do loop” for the machine 
to “forget” the index, and it was necessary to add “wakeup” 
statements and dummy subroutines to the code to make sure the 
machine “remembered.” But as a result, we learned a lot about 
how the compiler “translated”. We also learned how to use 
FORTRAN in ways that were not anticipated by the compiler 
designers in order to save memory and perform tasks that we 
otherwise could not have done.  
When the sections were formed in the spring of 1962 to con-
duct analysis in support of the Propulsion Research Division’s 
research and the Atlas/Centaur program, there were few if any 
codes available commercially. Unlike the present, we had no 
choice but to develop our own codes in order to do our analysis. 
Numerical analysis, as such, did not exist or was in its infancy. 
We were unaware of any text books on the subject. We had to 
do the best we could with the codes we had developed as of the 
moment and we were constantly improving existing codes and 
developing new ones. When we were asked to tackle a new 
problem, we were never confident that we could formulate a 
code that would answer the questions being asked using the 
slow, small computer of that era. We soon found that the opti-
mization of Atlas/Centaur trajectories was not feasible by way 
of the perturbation techniques we had used to up to that point. 
The only way to converge the two-point boundary problem was 
to obtain accurate analytical, partial derivatives. This meant nu-
merically integrating many more differential equations. (The 
last version of the code numerically integrated almost 200 equa-
tions.) This was a real challenge to implement with the 
FORTRAN and mainframes of the time. For instance, numeri-
cal integration was done in double precision to obtain the de-
sired accuracy. (With the arrival of the Cray supercomputers 
many years later, the need for double precision variables and 
operations was greatly diminished.) 
When this code was initially developed, the discipline of nu-
merical analysis was either undeveloped or in its infancy. The 
numerical problems encountered in the development of 
DUKSUP were solved by the developer by observing the lack 
of accuracy in the results of numerical calculations and solving 
the problems empirically and not theoretically. A course in nu-
merical analysis as it later developed would have been quite 
useful. Another complication in the beginning was that 
FORTRAN was not standardized and in fact was in develop-
ment also. We did know enough to be outraged with a routine 
would compile one day and might not again for several weeks. 
But learning, of necessity, how FORTRAN was translated into 
machine language gave us an advantage in saving storage and 
using FORTRAN in ways for which it was never intended. 
Later attempts to force good coding practices (no doubt well 
intended and in the end highly desirable) could only frustrate 
those of us who had learned to “trick” what is now a primitive 
language. 
When we started a new code or modified an existing code, 
we were never sure that it would “fit” on the machine. Conse-
quently, we were never sure that an immense amount of work 
might come to naught. Thanks to the initial problems with 
FORTRAN, we were aware of how it compiled and we de-
signed codes to take advantage of any techniques that would 
save storage. We also designed to code such that core could be 
reused. This led to DUKSUP’s structure and intimate reliance 
on FORTRAN’s “Common Block” feature. Subroutines would 
pass data back and forth through the Common rather than argu-
ments in the Calls. A major problem resulted from this type of 
operation in that identifying a variable’s numeric value had to 
be done by querying specific cells in the Common rather than 
the variable itself. Other operations also used prodigious 
amounts of memory. Integrating as many as two hundred equa-
tions took a lot of core. Inverting a 20x20 matrix also used a lot 
of storage. The code was organized to use shared storage since 
the operations were independent. Almost all variables were as-
signed specific storage locations (i.e., the Common) such that 
where feasible, other variables were temporarily stored in the 
same location to save space. This made debugging the code dif-
ficult because the same cell would have a different variable de-
pending on where the code crashed. And like all engineering 
and scientific codes of that era, DUKSUP’s coding was unstruc-
tured (aka “spaghetti code,” dominated by “GOTO statements”) 
due to the lack of available memory and the limited capability 
of FORTRAN’s early versions. DUKSUP was typically run-
ning with as few as two or three unused cells in memory. This 
was a standard procedure until the late 1970s, when larger, 
faster machines became available. One consequence of these 
operational constraints was that DUKSUP was virtually un-
documentable because of the convoluted code design required 
to save memory space. 
5.4 Overview of Algorithm Structure and 
General Operation 
What follows is a general description of the code without de-
tailing the internal subroutine interactions, nor the many ver-
sions that were created during the almost 30 years of its usage. 
Since DUKSUP was developed to analyze performance for the 
Atlas/Centaur, its structure was driven by the vehicle and how 
it operated. The rest of the code structure and operation was 
driven by the early computer’s limitations (see Secs. 5.3. and 
8.0). As a result, the code was structured to be as compact (in 
terms of memory) and fast as we could make it. Consequently, 
it was broken into two parts; first: the nonvariational zero angle-
of-attack section (controlled by the MAIN procedure) and sec-
ond: the remainder of the trajectory. This second part consti-
tuted the majority of DUKSUP, that is to say, the two point 
boundary value problem (2PBVP), which included the  
variational part of the problem, beginning with the jettison of  
 
NASA/TM—2015-218753 11 
the booster engines. This second part was controlled by subrou-
tine MAIN2, which was called by MAIN, but functioned as a 
second main procedure, and continued until the end of program 
execution. DUKSUP’s algorithm structure is illustrated in  
Figure 5, but this is only representative of the discussion in Sec-
tions 3.0 and 4.0 (i.e., is not necessarily reflective of how the 
detailed, multiple subroutine calls actually took place). Any 
more than a top-level discussion of its operation would warrant 
a separate paper in and of itself (see Secs. 5.2. and 5.3). 
The first part of the code operation was for flight of the Atlas 
booster at zero angle of attack, from liftoff to booster engine 
cut-off (BECO). The trajectory was integrated, but flown open 
loop and external to the majority of the code operation. During 
these early phases, the Main procedure called atmosphere-re-
lated subroutines (by way of the integration subroutine). To 
save computer time, when aerodynamic heating during launch 
was specified, the code satisfied the constraint by integrating 
only through the booster section, since almost all of the heating 
occurred up to that point. If the kick angle were to be optimized 
(which occurred in the booster phase of flight), and since pay-
load was determined upon reaching the desired orbit, the pay-
load to final injection had to be obtained first to optimize the 
kick angle (and maximize payload). 
The second part of the code (and the majority of its operation) 
was driven by a generalized Newton-Raphson routine which it-
erated to solve the 2PBVP. However, the majority of the oper  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.—DUKSUP Algorithm Structure 
 
 
ation and complexity of the 2PBVP resided in the calculus of 
variations subroutines and the integration subroutine. Subrou-
tine MAIN2 controlled the 2PBVP. The number of initial and 
final conditions was variable. In some simple cases, the number 
could be as small as two. It was usually as many as eight, but in 
one case it was twelve. The user could select various combina-
tions of final conditions as well as intermediate constraints 
(Table 2). The variational equations and the partials related to 
these intermediate constraints/final conditions were analyti-
cally derived and hard-coded into the algorithm. They represent 
some of the most intellectually challenging aspects of the code, 
and at the same time some of the most powerful aspects of 
DUKSUP, speeding up its execution and even enabling conver-
gence to an optimal solution at all. That is, compared to other 
codes (which were predominantly numerical in nature), the 
speed of DUKSUP with its built-in analytical theory and equa-
tions, was incredibly fast without sacrificing performance. This 
was independent of the hardware platform (computer). Within 
the 2PBVP were the operations which interpreted the specified 
conditions and which calculated the Transversality conditions 
for those variables which were left free to be optimized. These 
conditions defined the problem to be optimized. A 4th Order 
Runge-Kutta subroutine then integrated the equations of mo-
tion, the variational (Euler-Lagrange) equations, and also their 
partial derivatives (which were exact, analytically derived 
equations, not numerically arrived at approximations). The dif-
ferences between the end conditions and the desired final con-
ditions (both those specified and those which were left to be 
optimized) were evaluated. These differences were then used 
with the exact partials to calculate values for the Newton-
Raphson iteration scheme. The problem was then rerun with a 
new set of initial guesses. This would continue until the conver-
gence criteria were satisfied, thus arriving at a solution. A sim-
plified overview of this algorithm exists in a publication 
external to LeRC (Ref. 9). 
 
TABLE 2.—USER SELECTABLE INTERMEDIATE 
CONSTRAINTS AND FINAL CONDITIONS 
Intermediate  
constraints 
Final (in-plane)  
conditions 
Final (out-of-plane)  
conditions 
Radius Energy (C3) Inclination 
Velocity Apogee radius Argument of perigee 
Sin  
(flight path angle) 
Perigee radius Ascending node 
Sin 
(elevation angle) 
Radius Declination of asymp-
tote (hyperbolic) 
Perigee radius True anomaly Right ascension of  
asymptote (hyperbolic) 
Energy (C3) Flight path angle  
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The code could accommodate up to four 2PBVPs simultane-
ously, with other nonvariational segments interspersed (though 
typically reserved for the atmospheric phase of flight). The 
flight could be split up into 100 time phases, the main unit of 
modeling the trajectory. Only five of these time phases however 
could be optimized, though they could be any combination of 
powered or coasting flight. Variational steering could be turned 
on or off throughout the trajectory, facilitating modeling of the 
small transients and other propulsive losses. Hardware could be 
dropped at the end of any phase. Phase lengths were specified 
if not designated for optimization. Thrusts and weight flows 
were specified for all powered phases, and various levels of fi-
delity were available modeling various sized engines. Various 
ways to constrain how the vehicle was allowed to fly (varia-
tional, constrained by planes, etc.) were available to the user. 
Towards the end of its utilization in the mid-1990s, DUKSUP 
had grown to over 5,200 lines of (almost totally) uncommented 
 
code. There were 29 primary subroutines, six major utilities, 
and 31 smaller utilities/functions. With the exception of a few 
new subroutines and modest upgrades, the code remained writ-
ten in FORTRAN IV throughout its life. 
5.5 Primary Subroutines 
The following is a brief summary of the 29 primary subrou-
tines within DUKSUP. While most were written by the lead au-
thor, including all the major routines, some (ORBEL, others) 
were adopted either in whole or in part from other earlier LeRC 
codes. In addition, there were six major utilities, several block 
data, and over 30 small utilities /functions included in the com-
pilation of the code. Figure 6 illustrates DUKSUP’s primary 
subroutines and how they were called. The following section 
contains a brief explanation of each of the primary subroutines, 
arranged in the order of appearance in Figure 6 from left to 
right, then top to bottom.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.—Subroutine Calls in DUKSUP 
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5.5.1 MAIN 
The main procedure of DUKSUP was actually broken up into 
two parts. MAIN initiated the program (and called INPUT and 
CVCNTL) and also performed the zero angle-of-attack (non-
variational) booster part of the problem. 
5.5.2 INPUT and Supporting Routines 
This routine provided a convenient and very flexible way of 
inputting data into the code. It had existed for some time prior 
to its use by the performance analysis group. It is unknown 
whether it had a single developer or whether it represented the 
consecutive efforts of several developers. We believe that one 
of the primary developers was Vearl N. Huff, an early re-
searcher at the NACA Lewis Research Center. It had been re-
written more than once to add features, making it more 
versatile. Arithmetic calculations as well as trigonometric and 
logarithmic functions were incorporated. As discussed, one of 
the greatest challenges to using a CoV optimization technique 
was solving the two point boundary problem. For other than 
simple problems, converging a problem usually involved mov-
ing from a solution of a related problem to the desired problem 
in small steps. Solving the problem was extremely dependent 
on acquiring initial guesses that were close to the final guesses 
which led to the solution. This routine simplified the tedious 
task of assembling the input for a series of problems leading to 
the solution. (Called from MAIN) 
5.5.3 CVCNTL 
The name of this subroutine was shorthand for “Calculus of 
Variations Control”. The possible end conditions for the code 
are energy, radius, flight path angle, injection true anomaly, ap-
ogee radius, perigee radius, declination, right ascension, incli-
nation, argument of perigee, and node. (If both right ascension 
and declination were specified, this defined an asymptote for a 
hyperbolic trajectory for an interplanetary mission). Any inde-
pendent set of these could be entered as desired end conditions. 
This routine was very complicated, but set up the problem and 
designated the initial conditions and final conditions to be eval-
uated. These in turn were used to obtain the desired final orbit 
and identified the equations which I call variational end condi-
tions. These end conditions, when satisfied, provided the opti-
mum value of the unspecified element. This routine made the 
code usable for new users who were relieved from understand-
ing the calculus of variations and facilitated converging the two 
point boundary value problem. (Called from MAIN) 
5.5.4 MAIN2 
This subroutine served as the main procedure for the remain-
der of the problem, beginning with the jettison of the booster 
engines. (Called from MAIN)  
5.5.5 WTLIFT 
This subroutine determines the time after SRM ignition when 
a thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.0 is achieved and the vehicle weight 
at that time. (Called from MAIN) 
5.5.6 DAMODE 
This subroutine set up the output mode (i.e., print out of re-
sults) for converged and nonconverged cases; and also boost 
and variational phases. (Called from MAIN, MAIN2) 
5.5.7 WTCOMP 
This subroutine was called at the end of a trajectory. It calcu-
lated the final payload after flight performance reserve (FPR) 
and any other reserves were subtracted from the weight at the 
end of the integration. There were many versions of this routine, 
depending on the problem. For an exploratory study to deter-
mine the payload potential for some mission (given a repre-
sentative target), FPR was often calculated as a linear function 
of burnout weight. That linear function was derived from plot-
ting FPR’s from actual missions where FPR had been rigor-
ously determined using dispersion data from previous flights. 
Dispersions in determining initial weight, engine performance, 
jettison weights, and other factors were used to determine an 
FPR for an actual mission. It was found that these rigorously 
determined FPR’s fell close to a line that was a function of burn-
out weight. WTCOMP also provided a convenient place to 
make other calculations of interest to us or to the spacecraft, 
since DUKSUP users knew the program was at the end of its 
execution. (Called from MAIN2) 
5.5.8 CVMAIN 
This routine set up the calculus of variations problem and 
called RUNGEK. The partial derivatives for solving the two-
point boundary value problem had to be analytical, not obtained 
by perturbing initial conditions and calculating “partials” from 
differences in final conditions from the nominal. (Called from 
MAIN2) 
5.5.9 RUNGEK 
A 4th order Runge-Kutta algorithm resided in subroutine 
RUNGEK. The foundation of the code was this routine which 
numerically integrated the differential equations characteristic of 
problems of this sort. Adopted from the LeRC N-Body (Ref. 2) 
and the low-thrust Mars codes (Ref. 7), this variable step-size, 
fourth order, double precision Runge-Kutta routine used a single 
precision Simpson’s rule parallel integration technique to vary 
step-size such that the difference between the two integration 
techniques could be specified. Step-size was varied to maintain 
that set difference. The Runge-Kutta was the more accurate  
integration technique and the results from that integration 
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were used to “boot strap” the integration. We rewrote the routine 
to meet our requirements. (Called from MAIN, MAIN2, 
CVMAIN) 
5.5.10 START 
This routine set up the steering angles and their rates of 
change for the start of the problem, along with other initial var-
iables. (Called from CVMAIN) 
5.5.11 EQUATE 
This subroutine supplied the derivatives for the integration. It 
was a short routine which called several other routines, either 
directly or indirectly. (Called from RUNGEK) 
5.5.12 STEP 
This subroutine compared the results of the Runge-Kutta in-
tegration with a Simpson’s rule integration. The integration step 
size was adjusted continuously to maintain a designated differ-
ence between the two methods. If the difference did not exceed 
an upper bound, the integration was accepted and integration 
proceeds. If the difference exceeds the bound, the step size was 
reduced based on a linear interpolation and the integration is 
“redone.” (Called from RUNGEK) 
5.5.13 OBLATE 
Subroutine OBLATE provided three harmonics of the 
Earth’s oblateness. We found that it was necessary to include 
Earth oblateness in the trajectory calculations when long coasts 
were included. The impact of the Earth’s oblateness is signifi-
cant for long missions, such as GSO missions. Orbit elements 
changed noticeably for these missions. We did not expect that 
the effects of oblateness would be required in the derivation of 
optimum steering and staging. However, parametric investiga-
tion of optimum staging revealed that neglecting this effect re-
sulted in significant errors in optimum staging. Incorporation of 
the first harmonic of the oblateness in the CoV derivation elim-
inated the discrepancy. Eventually, using the first four harmon-
ics became standard procedure. (Called from EQUATE) 
5.5.14 ATMOS 
Subroutine ATMOS provided atmospheric pressure as a 
function of altitude. Input to the routine was altitude and output 
was atmospheric pressure. The atmosphere was modeled by 
polynomials which were based on the standard atmosphere for 
the launch site at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), 
Florida. (Called from EQUATE) 
5.5.15 AERO 
Subroutine AERO provided drag coefficients as a function of 
Mach number. There were different drag coefficients for the por-
tion of flight where the booster engines were attached and oper-
ating. A different drag coefficient applied after the booster 
engines were jettisoned. Mach number was input and the drag 
coefficient was output. Drag on the vehicle was then calculated. 
Winds could be incorporated but this was rarely used. Lift coef-
ficients could also be implemented, but were very rarely exer-
cised since the vehicle was normally constrained to fly in a near 
zero-angle-of-attack mode. We were aware that some angle of 
attack would increase payload, but uncertainty in the calculation 
of bending loads and local heating rates dictated conservatism in 
inducing angles of attack. (Called from EQUATE) 
5.5.16 SIMPRO 
This subroutine calculated the thrusts of up to three engines, 
each with their own performance characteristics which could be 
quadratic functions of time. (Called from EQUATE) 
5.5.17 BLISS 
This routine initialized the calculus of variations problem, in-
cluding initializing the equations for obtaining the analytical 
partials. It also supplied the derivatives of the calculus of vari-
ations adjoint variables during the integration of the differential 
equations. It would be very difficult to guess at the adjoint var-
iables to begin the solution of the two point boundary value 
problem. Instead, the adjoint variables were calculated from in-
itial guesses at pitch angle, the rate of change of pitch angle, 
yaw angle, and the rate of change of yaw angle. These variables 
had obvious physical meanings and reasonable guesses could 
be made. This subroutine was named after Gilbert Ames Bliss 
of the University of Chicago, one of the first leaders of the Cal-
culus of Variations (particularly the Problem of Bolza) 
(Ref. 10). (Called from EQUATE) 
5.5.18 THRUST 
This subroutine calculated the vehicle thrust accelerations in 
Cartesian coordinates. (Called from EQUATE) 
5.5.19 COAST 
A subroutine pertained to the insulation panels and payload 
fairing. (Called from STEP) 
5.5.20 STAGE 
A weight (representing a spent stage, jettisoned hardware, 
etc.) could be dropped at the end of each phase. This subroutine 
decreased the current stack weight by the prescribed amount at 
end of that phase. (Called from STEP) 
5.5.21 OUTPUT 
This subroutine calculated various orbital elements not cal-
culated by ORBEL, as well as various steering angles, and other 
quantities. It then printed out resultant variables at times con-
trolled by DAMODE. (Called from MAIN, RUNGEK, STEP) 
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5.5.22 TITPRO 
This subroutine computes the Titan SRM/thrust vector con-
trol (TVC) thrusts, weight-flows (wtflows), and wtflows of the 
inerts in a manner similar to subroutine SIMPRO. These values 
are then fed into SIMPRO to compute total thrusts and wtflows. 
(Called from SIMPRO) 
5.5.23 TUDES 
This subroutine calculated the initial state vector at lift-off (or 
at some later point) from initial latitude, longitude, and altitude. 
Usually this was the launch pad, but in some versions of 
DUKSUP, it could be a point after lift-off, such as in orbit, 
where latitude, longitude, radius, and elapsed time might have 
been input to calculate an initial state vector. This was used ex-
tensively for the Shuttle/Centaur studies. (Called from STAGE) 
5.5.24 OPTSTG 
This subroutine calculated the variational equations and their 
derivatives used to optimize the durations of burns and coasts. 
DUKSUP permitted the optimization of the duration of as many 
as five variable (time) “phases”. These phases could have been 
powered or coasts. The five that were selected to perform the 
GSO missions were: the Centaur’s two burns, separated by a 
coast (which had a very low thrust to keep propellants settled), 
a long coast up to geostationary altitude, followed by an injec-
tion burn into the final orbit. (Called from STAGE) 
5.5.25 FINALB 
This subroutine was called when any specified intermediate 
condition and its derivatives must be evaluated. These interme-
diate conditions included energy, radius, flight path angle, true 
anomaly, perigee radius, apogee radius, and view angle from a 
designated ground tracking site. Many of the equations used 
here were identical to those in FINAL, they were just evaluated 
at an intermediate point in the trajectory. There are conditions 
which were not included in FINALB, such as declination and 
right ascension. FINALB was called before the vehicle reached 
escape velocity, so those variables would not be defined at that 
point in the trajectory. Theoretically, they could be included if 
an intermediate hyperbolic target were desired, which was un-
likely. Any time an intermediate constraint was imposed, there 
was a discontinuity in the adjoint variables. Sometimes the dis-
continuity could be calculated, but other times the discontinuity 
required that a single input constant be applied to calculated 
vectors for each of the discontinuities in the adjoint variables. 
As there were discontinuities in the adjoint variables, these dis-
continuities introduced associated discontinuities in the partial 
derivatives. Those discontinuities are calculated for each of the 
partials and the partials were then “corrected” to incorporate the 
constraint. (Called from STAGE) 
5.5.26 FINAL 
This subroutine calculated the designated end conditions and 
the analytic derivatives of those conditions from the final state 
vector and its derivatives. It also calculated the variational end 
conditions required to optimize the orbit elements that are not 
specified targets. CVCNTL set up the problem and provided 
FINAL with the appropriate list of conditions to be evaluated. 
(Called from CVMAIN, STAGE) 
5.5.27 ORBEL 
This subroutine calculated orbital elements and time to peri-
gee from a state vector. Parts of this routine were originally 
written for the low thrust code, and were unchanged for perhaps 
60 years. (Called from OUTPUT) 
5.5.28 TRACKER 
This subroutine calculates the elevation angle, range, and 
other visibility variables from various ground tracking stations 
and on-orbit assets to the launch vehicle. (Called from 
OUTPUT) 
5.5.29 CRASH 
This subroutine calculated where on the oblate surface of the 
Earth the vehicle would impact if thrust were terminated. The 
information from this routine is used to plot the instantaneous 
impact point trace for a trajectory and was a major contributor 
to the calculations of risk by Range Safety at the Cape. (Called 
from OUTPUT) 
5.5.30 WISSEN, ITERAT, MINMAX, INVERT, 
RASCAL, ERRORZ (major utilities) 
More than just utilities, these original or significantly  
upgraded subroutines found the maximums/minimums of func-
tions, inverted nonsingular N X N matrixes, performed linear or 
parabolic interpolation schemes, etc. (Called from various loca-
tions) 
5.5.31 Block Data (various) 
There were several Block Data loads within DUKSUP per-
taining to the INPUT routine, atmospheric model, initialized 
vehicle characteristics, tolerances, geo-physical data, etc. 
5.5.32 Other Smaller Utilities and Functions 
There were over 30 smaller utilities and functions which were 
either too small to mention or improvements over existing li-
brary functions. They were part of the code when submitted to 
the compiler, not merely routines linked to satisfy unresolved 
references in the object code. 
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5.6 Versions of the Code 
Although DUKSUP had a single basic structure, because of 
computer limitations and the analytic environment, there was 
never a single version of the code. As new missions material-
ized, the code was changed and/or augmented to solve the new 
problem. Sometimes these changes were incorporated into a 
new version of the code if we thought that that particular prob-
lem would reoccur frequently enough to merit the work and 
time involved. For instance, when SKYLAB drag threatened 
and finally did result in re-entry, the possibility of using the At-
las/Centaur to raise its orbit to prolong its life was proposed. A 
new version of DUKSUP was created to do rendezvous mis-
sions. The study was completed (it was possible), but the 
changes in the code needed to do that analysis were never in-
corporated into the “standard” version since it was not antici-
pated that another rendezvous mission for Atlas/Centaur would 
be proposed.  
The original version of the code utilized select sub-routines 
from other existing computer programs, such as the RUNKEK, 
ORBEL, and INPUT routines. The author’s work with the Liv-
ing Booster Table was also incorporated. But the lion-share of 
the code relied on new, major subroutines written by the lead 
author (originally 26, later expanded to 29). These were the Cal-
culus of Variations routines just discussed in the preceding sec-
tion. Together with the modeling of the Atlas/Centaur, all this 
combined constituted the first version of DUKSUP. Figure 7 
illustrates an approximation of how DUKSUP originated and 
how its various versions evolved. 
The earliest version of DUKSUP was written specifically to 
analyze Atlas/Centaur missions. Later, other versions (‘decks’) 
were created. The Titan deck was similar to the Atlas deck, but 
it did contain modifications to use the ‘table look up’ data for 
the monolithic solid rocket motors used as the first stage. The 
last version of the Titan deck was used solely for the Cassini 
mission on Titan IV/Centaur. It had significant modifications in 
subroutine STAGE, which incorporated optimal payload fair-
ing jettison logic based on qV (see Sec. 7.2) into the variational 
problem. Another deck had been created which solved a ren-
dezvous problem (see Sec. 9.6), which was then readily modi-
fied into the on-orbit deck for Shuttle/Centaur missions. 
Though this version (SHUTSUP) retained all the atmospheric 
routines of its predecessors, they were not called upon during 
the execution of the on-orbit deck for these missions. Another 
variant existed written in spherical coordinates but was not used 
for launch support. The most powerful and sophisticated ver-
sion, SUPERDUK, could solve varying launch azimuth while 
also constraining the ascent to be within the line of sight of 
ground tracking stations. Since others in the launch organiza-
tion could not easily use this result, SUPERDUK was never 
used again (Sec.11.10).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.—DUKSUP’s Origin and Evolution of Its Versions (dashed boxes indicate other authors) 
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5.7 Atlas/Centaur Steering Versus CoV and 
the Post-Flight Correlation to Actuals 
In the late 1960s, these trajectory solutions were only obtain-
able by using a CoV formulation of the problem. The trajecto-
ries were 3D, which were sufficient to obtain the needed targets 
for the on-board guidance system. The 3D vehicle models used 
for the CoV were based on detailed, post-flight reconstruction 
of flight data. The pitch steering algorithm for the vehicle was 
a linear tangent law.3 The CoV solution collapsed to this linear 
tangent steering law if the Earth was assumed flat and the grav-
ity constant. The Centaur on-board computer actually recalcu-
lated a and b every 8 sec during flight, yielding a very nearly 
optimum trajectory. Optimum trajectories from lift-off to GSO 
injection obtained using DUKSUP’s CoV algorithm were 
matched by the Centaur’s linear tangent steering quite closely 
(within a couple of pounds). Accurate determination and pre-
diction of performance allowed the Atlas/Centaurs to be flown 
with very small performance margins (near zero for some mis-
sions) above the flight performance reserve (FPR) (which was 
carried to protect against 3σ in-flight dispersions). This means 
that we obtained the most payload available from the vehicle. 
Each segment (phase of flight) was analyzed independently 
to ensure that the performance characteristics of the segment 
matched the flight data. In most cases, the thrust level was de-
termined by loading vacuum thrusts and exit areas for as many 
as three engine types. Three engine types were modeled be-
cause the Atlas at lift off had two booster engines, a sustainer 
engine, and (small) vernier engines. Each of these engine sys-
tems was modeled separately for simplicity. In atmospheric 
flight, total vehicle thrust was the vector sum of each vacuum 
engine thrust value reduced by the product of engine exit area 
and atmospheric pressure. 
Post-flight reconstruction was a comprehensive analysis of 
how the vehicle flew. A system-by-system review of actual 
flight data was performed after each launch by the GD/LeRC 
team. A primary reason for this major activity was to correlate 
preflight predictions made by analytical tools to flight actuals. 
Thrust, specific impulse, and acceleration as functions of time, 
as well as telemetered and radar tracking state vector data, were 
key parts of the post-flight analysis. As a result of verification 
through many post-flight analyses, DUKSUP enabled us to pre-
dict Atlas/Centaur performance—a vehicle with a ~360,000 lb 
gross liftoff weight (GLOW)—to within less than 1 lb. 
3 A linear tangent law has the form: tan θ = a + bt, where θ is the 
angle between the thrust vector and the local horizontal, a and b are 
constants, and t is time. 
6.0 Centaur Configurations and Their 
Boosters 
All Centaur upper stage configurations were manufactured 
by General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division (later Gen-
eral Dynamics (GD) Space Systems Division), Kearny Mesa, 
California. Centaur’s first stage boosters, however, were man-
ufactured by various aerospace companies: General Dynamics 
(GD) for Atlas, Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC) for Titan, 
and Rockwell International for the Space Shuttle. The booster 
+ upper stage analytical models resided partially in the input 
datasets (for variables likely to be changing) and partially 
within the code itself (for more invariant parts). How DUKSUP 
was structured and executed was fundamentally driven by how 
the launch vehicle itself operated. All LeRC-led Centaur mis-
sions were launched from pads at Cape Canaveral AFS. 
6.1 Atlas/Centaur 
The Atlas boosters were built by General Dynamics in 
Kearny Mesa (San Diego), California. During the tenure of the 
LeRC-led launch vehicle program, the Atlas/Centaur was a two 
and one half stage vehicle based on its heritage as the nation’s 
earliest ICBM. At liftoff, three main MA-5 engines (two 
booster and a single sustainer engine) were burning using pro-
pellant from the same Atlas tanks. The booster engines were 
shut down and jettisoned upon a thrust-to-weight ratio of 
~5.7 g’s. After BECO, they were jettisoned based on measure-
ments from an on-board accelerometer, while the sustainer en-
gine was shut down based on low (propellant) level sensors. 
During the sustainer phase of flight, the insulation panels were 
jettisoned. Following sustainer engine cutoff (SECO) and Atlas 
jettison, Centaur phase of flight began. During the Centaur 
phase of flight, the payload fairing was jettisoned (in later years, 
the PLF was jettisoned earlier, prior to SECO). Centaur shut-
downs were by guidance command, though missions in the 
1990s accommodated “minimum residual shutdowns” and “in-
flight retargeting” for the second burn. Figure 8 shows a draw-
ing of the Atlas/Centaur vehicle and a photo of AC-45 on the 
pad prepared for launch of the HEAO-1 spacecraft (Ref. 11). A 
typical Atlas/Centaur flight profile is illustrated in Figure 9 
(Ref. 11). Figure 10 is an artist’s rendition of the Centaur with 
the Intelsat IV payload following fairing separation (Ref. 11). 
To determine the performance capability of the Atlas/Cen-
taur, an analytical model was constructed (partially within the 
input dataset) that was of sufficient detail to provide a 3D (not 
6D) simulation of the vehicle. To fit on core, the model was  
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only as complex as necessary to determine payload and trajec-
tory characteristics. The model allowed us to predict the perfor-
mance of the ~360,000 lb GLOW vehicle to less than 1 lb. This 
was verified by post-flight analyses. The vehicle model could 
be broken into as many as 100 segments. Base pres-
sure/thrust/Isp/drag models for the Atlas were loaded as func-
tions of Mach number. Vacuum thrust, flow-rate, and engine 
exit area could be constant or could vary linearly with time for 
each segment. If needed and with little effort, thrust and flow-
rate could vary nonlinearly by employing a polynomial. Hard-
ware weight could be dropped at the end of each segment. Con-
straints could be applied to each segment independently. Engine 
startups and shutdown times were typically very short and were 
found to be sufficient to model these with constant flow rates 
and thrusts. Flow rate was determined from data acquired from 
engine testing and thrust was determined by calculating the total 
impulse provided by the startup and shutdown flight data. It was 
verified that for such short segments, a more detailed approxi-
mation did not affect the payload determination.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.—AC-45 (HEAO-1) at Complex-36B 
with Vehicle Diagram 
 
 
 
Figure 9.—Atlas/Centaur Ascent Profile 
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Figure 10.—Artist View of Centaur and Intelsat IV 
6.2 Titan/Centaur 
The Titan boosters were built by Martin Marietta in Denver, 
Colorado. There were two Titan configurations on which Cen-
taur rode: the IIIE and IV. The Titan IIIE/Centaur was devel-
oped in the early 1970s and flew from 1974 to 1977. The Titan 
IV/Centaur flew for the U.S. Air Force (USAF) 16 times from 
1994 to 2003, though only one was a NASA launch (and the 
last mission managed by LeRC in 1997—Cassini). (There was 
one other Titan variant; see Sec. 6.4.) The Titan IIIE/Centaur 
was a four stage vehicle based on its heritage as another of the 
nation’s ICBMs. At liftoff, the two monolithic Solid Rocket 
Motors (SRMs) lifted the stack with a GLOW of ~1.4 M lb. The 
SRM’s flew until burnout and were jettisoned. The first core 
stage engines were ignited in flight just before SRM tail-off and 
continued until exhaustion shutdown. The payload fairing cov-
ered the Centaur stage as well as the payload, and was jettisoned 
during stage one. Following a ‘fire in the hole’ separation ma-
neuver to jettison core stage one, the single engine core stage 
two flew until either guidance or low level sensor commanded 
shut down. Following jettison of core stage two, Centaur flight 
operation began. Centaur shutdowns were by guidance com-
mand. For Titan IIIE/Centaur stack, Centaur avionics steered 
all stages. Years later, however, for Titan IV, this would not be 
the case, as Titan IV had its own avionics suite. Figure 11 shows 
the Titan IIIE/Centaur vehicle. Titan IIIE/Centaur had the ca-
pability to perform variable launch azimuth ascent, which its 
successor (Titan IV) years later lacked. 
Most of the Titan IIIE/Centaur model was analogous to the 
Atlas input dataset and will not be repeated here. There was one 
major system which was quite different than Atlas: the two 
monolithic SRMs. These propulsive stages, ignited at liftoff, 
could not be modeled as a liquid propelled stage in vacuum. 
DUKSUP modeled their operation by utilizing a “table look-
up” approach, where the SRM’s performance was given as 
functions of Mach number. Two of the launches (Voyager) also 
included a large solid “kick” stage. Two drag models for the 
Titan had to be incorporated, with and without the solids.  
 
 
Figure 11.—Titan IIIE/Centaur at Complex-41 (CCAFS) 
6.3 Shuttle/Centaur 
The Space Shuttle was to serve as a booster for Centaur, the 
first time Centaur would be integrated with a manned vehicle. 
The Centaur diameter was widened from the 10 ft version on 
Atlas and Titan, to 15 ft to match the Shuttle cargo bay diame-
ter. The Shuttle system was built by Rockwell International 
Space Systems Group, Downey, California, along with other 
major contractors Thiokol and Martin Marietta. However, since 
Centaur was integrated within the cargo bay and classified as a 
“payload” rather than a major “element”, the NASA Johnson 
Spaceflight Center (JSC) served as the interface organization 
for LeRC. 
In the early 1980s, LeRC was assigned to manage, develop, 
integrate, and launch Shuttle/Centaur, a joint NASA-USAF de-
velopment program. There would be two new versions of the new 
Centaur to be launched from the Space Shuttle: the smaller “G” 
version primarily for national security missions and the larger 
“G-Prime” version designed primarily for NASA interplanetary 
missions. Shuttle/Centaur and its payload were to be cradled by 
the Centaur Integrated Support System (CISS) within the Shuttle 
cargo bay. The CISS and the forward attach points supported the 
upper stage and payload from Space Shuttle mating through 
cargo bay deployment on-orbit. Once in orbit, with cargo bay 
doors opened, the CISS rotated the Centaur/payload to the de-
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ployment angle and the Centaur/payload were deployed. Shut-
tle/Centaur would then maneuver to a predetermined safe loca-
tion, fire its engines, and inject the spacecraft into its final orbit. 
This was quite unlike any prior Centaur operation, and it repre-
sented challenges for most of the Centaur program, including the 
trajectory design by DUKSUP. Figure 12 shows an artist’s ren-
dition of the deployment of a spacecraft from the Shuttle cargo 
bay, integrated with a Centaur stage. Figure 13 illustrates a typi-
cal Shuttle/Centaur flight profile (Ref. 12).  
Because Centaur would not be steering the Shuttle booster 
from launch to LEO, it had to rely on data from Shuttle, includ-
ing accurate state vectors. Thus a new “on-orbit” version called 
SHUTSUP (much of which was scavenged from the earlier 
“space tug” version) was developed which could start the tra-
jectory design and optimization from a Shuttle orbital state vec-
tor. None of the Shuttle phase flight from pad to LEO was 
performed by SHUTSUP, so it was able to easily determine the 
payload for these missions as well as the trajectory characteris-
tics, since lacking the sub-orbital phases of flight greatly sim-
plified the code and its execution. But there was one major 
complication unique to this booster which affected both Earth 
orbital and interplanetary missions, and had profound effect on 
how SHUTSUP was run: the particular orbit (revolution) on 
which the Centaur/payload could be deployed was allowed to 
vary. This not only meant that Centaur boiled off propellants, 
losing capability during each revolution, but also that the orbital 
node would regress for all deployment revolutions following 
the intended one. For Earth relative missions this meant a pen-
alty even for an on-time launch should deployment be delayed. 
For interplanetary missions, not only was there a penalty for on-
time launch with late deployment, but for a “second day deploy-
ment”, this also held the possibility of significantly different in-
terplanetary targets. (This was particularly true for the Galileo 
mission, where “first day deployment” targeted a main belt as-
teroid 29-Amphitrite for flyby, while a delay until “second day 
deployment” meant a significantly different hyperbolic target 
vector which was “non-Amphitrite” directed.) This was the im-
petus for a couple of significant modifications to SHUTSUP 
subroutines, the creation of stand-alone utilities to support mis-
sions on Shuttle/Centaur (such as multiple launch window anal-
ysis), and significant changes in how the mission was 
represented in the input dataset (see Sec. 9.4).  
 
 
Figure 12.—Artist Rendition of Shuttle/Centaur 
(Deployment from Cargo Bay) 
 
 
Figure 13.—Shuttle/Centaur Ascent and Mission Profile 
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Due to the Challenger failure of January 28, 1986, the Shut-
tle/Centaur project was cancelled on June 19, 1986. President 
Reagan decreed that there would be no more Shuttle launches 
for interplanetary or Earth orbit spacecraft. There proved to be 
exceptions—Galileo, Ulysses, and Magellan—all of which 
were re-assigned to the Shuttle-launched Inertial Upper Stage 
(IUS). The planned Shuttle missions for other spacecraft were 
cancelled. LeRC was asked by NASA Headquarters (HQ) to 
find “rides” for these spacecraft. Over the course of a year 
DUKSUP was used to match the requirements to available 
launch vehicles. Recovery from Challenger was difficult and 
the United States did not launch any nonmilitary spacecraft for 
almost 3 years. 
6.4 Titan 3/TOS 
The Titan 3/Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS) was the only LeRC-
led launch vehicle without the Centaur for which DUKSUP was 
used. The Titan 3/TOS was a short-lived commercial Titan 
booster with a TOS solid upper stage (a derivative of the IUS, 
but with a less capable avionics suite and smaller propellant 
loading). It was used by LeRC only once in 1992 to launch the 
Mars Observer (MO) spacecraft.  
7.0 The Flight Constraints 
7.1 Tower Clearance and Initial Angle 
of Attack 
The vehicle was constrained to fly vertically for approxi-
mately the first 15 sec of flight in order to clear the tower. We 
modeled this by constraining the thrust vector to be along the 
local vertical for 15 sec. After that initial phase, the vehicle in-
ertial velocity vector was instantaneously “kicked over” by usu-
ally less than a tenth of a degree in the launch azimuth direction. 
Until the end of the “zero-angle-of-attack” phase, the thrust 
vector was constrained to be in the launch azimuth plane. The 
thrust vector was determined by projecting a unit relative ve-
locity vector into the launch azimuth plane and defining that 
projection as the thrust direction until the vehicle could tolerate 
an angle-of-attack. The actual angles-of-attack were quite small 
and this was in fact the way the vehicle flew. We found that 
simulating this was necessary. If we constrained the thrust vec-
tor to be along the relative velocity vector, as kick angle 
changed, so did the inclination at the end of the first Centaur 
burn, which was not characteristic of the vehicle and was unac-
ceptable. The vehicle steering forced the thrust vector to be in 
the launch azimuth plane through the first Centaur burn. We 
could simulate that by optimizing the thrust direction subject to 
that constraint. Since in most cases, final inclination was spec-
ified, at some point in the trajectory, yaw was necessary to sat-
isfy final inclination.  
In most cases where the first Centaur burn inserted itself into 
LEO (or for an interplanetary launch where there was a single 
burn), the optimum kick angle would result in a trajectory 
where aerodynamic heating was in excess of the capability of 
the vehicle, the kick angle was varied using a simple iteration 
to satisfy the heating limitation of the vehicle. In some cases 
where the injection altitude was high, the kick angle had to be 
optimized to maximize payload. This was accomplished by us-
ing a parametric scheme where the payload as a function of kick 
angle and the optimum kick angle was obtained by locating the 
top of a parabola. This was not an elegant method, but it pro-
vided an accurate determination of the optimum kick angle 
since payload did not vary greatly with kick angle due to the 
fact the calculus of variations solution to the steering algorithm 
resulted in small payload variations. DUKSUP also had the ca-
pability of optimizing kick angle, but if the heating for the op-
timum exceeded the limit, the code would revert to satisfying 
the heating limit. 
7.2 Heating Constraints: Jettisoning  
Hardware on “qV” 
The Atlas/Centaur, and later on Titan/Centaur, vehicles were 
designed such that insulation panels (on Atlas/Centaur only) 
and payload fairings were jettisoned in flight. In those projects, 
insulation panels protecting the Centaur hydrogen tank and a 
nose fairing protecting the payload from aerodynamic heating 
were jettisoned. At the beginning, they were jettisoned on fixed 
times from some prior event, such as when an earlier stage had 
been jettisoned. These times were selected to make certain that 
aero/thermal loads had decreased to acceptable levels before 
panels or fairings were jettisoned. They were chosen conserva-
tively to make sure that the aero/thermal loads were “safe.” 
Eventually, as the projects matured, it was realized that payload 
could be increased by jettisoning panels and fairings on instan-
taneous heating rate (sometimes called “free molecular heating 
rate”) or qV ≡ (½ ρVr2)Vr , where q is the dynamic pressure, ρ 
is atmospheric density in mass per unit volume, and Vr is rela-
tive velocity, referred to as “V” (Ref. 8). The qV has units of 
energy/unit area/unit time; frequently quoted as lb/ft-sec (ft-
lb/ft2/sec), or Btu/ft2/sec. The components of qV were calcu-
lated on board the vehicle in the flight program. Relative veloc-
ity and altitude are calculated from integrating the measured 
acceleration. Atmospheric density, or ρ, was a pre-stored poly-
nomial function of altitude, accounting for 3-σ high dispersions 
in atmospheric density to be conservative. When jettisoning on 
qV, Atlas/Centaur panel jettison was enabled at 25 sec after 
BECO to ensure that the vehicle was stable. The guidance loop 
closed at BECO + 8 sec, and the guidance cycle was also 8 sec. 
Two cycles were required to ensure vehicle guidance stability. 
The qV limit was actually reached before 25 sec for some lofted 
trajectories, so jettison in those cases occurred at 25 sec rather 
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than on qV (Ref. 8). Panels were jettisoned on qV for some less 
lofted trajectories. Nose fairings were jettisoned on qV for At-
las/Centaur missions, as well as on the Titan IV/Centaur Cassini 
mission.  
Clearly, the earlier any weight can be jettisoned from a vehi-
cle, the greater the payload (the propellant required to raise the 
jettisonable weight to a higher energy level was now available 
to increase the final payload). A trajectory can be reshaped to 
climb more quickly, i.e., “lofted” above the optimum uncon-
strained by qV, such that the desired qV for jettison was reached 
at an earlier time. In this case, the panels were then jettisoned 
earlier, thus increasing payload. Lofting increases potential en-
ergy at the expense of kinetic energy, and jettison occurs at a 
higher altitude (lower ρ) and a lower relative velocity. It is im-
portant to note that if the same trajectory was flown as in the 
case with no qV constraint (i.e., no lofting), jettison on qV ra-
ther than on a later time would result in a very small payload 
gain. Flying a lofted trajectory was critical to allow the jettison 
to occur earlier, thus realizing the payload gain. To realize the 
full gain, the guidance equations might have had to be required 
to accommodate discontinuities. The trajectory optimization 
task was to determine the trajectory reshaping that will yield 
maximum payload. The optimum “trade” was between being 
able to jettison the hardware earlier, thus increasing payload, 
and reshaping the trajectory away from the optimum (without 
the constraint), which decreases payload. The qV constraint 
was included in the CoV formulation of the problem and solu-
tions were obtained. As expected, the trajectory was lofted (the 
trajectory was higher at any time point in the trajectory) and the 
relative velocity was lower – and payload was increased. The 
characteristics of the thrust vector history were instructive. CoV 
theory “proved” that as long as there are no constraints, the 
thrust vector and the rate of change of the thrust vector are both 
continuous. In the qV constrained trajectories, at the point of 
hardware jettison, the thrust vector and the rate of change of the 
thrust vector were discontinuous. The theory also showed that 
if the constraint was only a function of the vehicle position vec-
tor, the thrust vector was continuous, but the rate of change was 
discontinuous. If the constraint was only a function of the iner-
tial velocity, then the opposite was true. In the case of the qV 
constraint, the constraint was a function of both position and 
velocity, so both the thrust vector and the rate of change of the 
thrust vector are discontinuous, by theory. Examination of the 
trajectory demonstrated that this was indeed the case. In an en-
vironment dominated by senior test engineers who had spent 
much of their careers in the rigor of National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics (NACA) test cells, it was not sufficient 
to assert that the theory had provided the maximum payload 
meeting the qV constraint. It had to be demonstrated. First, it 
was shown that as the weight of the hardware to be jettisoned  
 
was increased, the jettison occurred earlier. It was also shown 
that as the jettison qV was reduced, the jettison occurred later. 
Furthermore, if the hardware weight jettisoned were split be-
tween hardware jettisoned at a fixed time and the remainder jet-
tisoned on qV, the trajectory shape (and payload) would revert 
to the solution where jettison occurred at a fixed time. The tra-
jectory would gradually approach the trajectory for jettisoning 
on time as the percentage of hardware jettisoned on time, not 
qV, approached 100 percent. The time for jettison on qV would 
move back toward the fixed time as the percentage of weight 
jettisoned on qV diminished, and the discontinuities would dis-
appear, reproducing the unconstrained trajectory.  
Obtaining the optimum constrained trajectory was just the 
beginning; it had to be implemented in the vehicle guidance 
system to obtain the payload benefit. If the entire benefit were 
to be realized, then a discontinuity in the thrust vector and rate 
of change of the thrust vector had to be introduced into the guid-
ance equations at the jettison point. This meant that some kind 
of “optimized,” intermediate state vector would probably be re-
quired at the point of hardware jettison. This was not easy to 
implement, so we were asked to assess the payload impact of 
eliminating these discontinuities. For Atlas/Centaur, the pay-
load difference was small because the insulation panels 
weighed only about 1200 lb and the nose fairing only about 
3000 lb (Ref. 8). So, the qV constraint was implemented on the 
vehicle without the discontinuity and the payload gain, mission 
dependent, was on the order of several tens of pounds. This was 
considered to be a very significant increase for Atlas/Centaur 
missions, justifying the effort.  
With the development of the Titan IV program in the mid-
1980s, payload fairings grew considerably in length and mass. 
The longest fairing configuration, built to accommodate the 
Centaur G-Prime vehicle which was adopted from the recently 
cancelled Shuttle/Centaur program, was 86 ft long and weighed 
in excess of 14,000 lb. The Titan deck of DUKSUP was modi-
fied in 1986 to enable the simulation of the new Titan IV vehi-
cle, including jettisoning its new, large fairings on qV. This 
resulted in payload gains in the 100’s of pounds (Ref. 8). How-
ever, this made the convergence of the two-point boundary 
value problem more sensitive because of the modeling of the 
atmosphere at those altitudes. A “smoother” atmospheric model 
would have solved the problem. While LeRC was not brought 
into the Titan IV development by the USAF, this upgrade to 
DUKSUP was not in vain. The CRAF and Cassini missions 
were green-lighting of pre-Phase-A study in the early 1990s. 
The analysis challenge was very similar but not identical to the 
analysis for the Voyager missions. Unlike Voyager’s Titan 
IIIE/Centaur, Centaur guidance system did not control Titan IV, 
which complicated the implementation of the variable launch 
azimuth requirements for the interplanetary missions. LeRC  
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used the enhanced Titan deck to perform leading edge analyses 
of those missions. After LeRC was given Authority to Proceed 
to prepare to launch the Cassini mission, this significantly  
enhanced version of DUKSUP was used to create trajectories 
optimized for payload fairing jettison to a secure large perfor-
mance improvement. The launch of Cassini would also be the 
last mission for DUKSUP. 
By jettisoning on qV, the vehicle payload was maximized 
with no additional risk, as the trajectory was optimized to jetti-
son the panels and the nose fairing when the aero/thermal envi-
ronment met constraints. For example, a thermal constraint 
could result from an analysis of the heat loads that an avionics 
box can tolerate. The decision to implement qV as a jettison 
criterion for the Atlas/Centaur panels and fairing and the Ti-
tan/Centaur fairing reflected the general project policy to de-
velop the capability of using optimum trajectories for all 
missions. Further, jettisoning on qV ensured that this hardware 
was jettisoned neither before nor after the actual, physical con-
straint was satisfied. In addition, having a totally optimized tra-
jectory responsive to functional constraints, such as jettison on 
qV, ensured that the maximum energy was available to recover 
from in-flight dispersions or anomalies. This approach maxim-
ized the probability of mission success (see Sec. 11.7). Trajec-
tories were optimally designed to be consistent with whatever 
constraints were applicable to a particular mission. This ap-
proach gave project management accurate data which allowed 
it to make informed decisions about the relative merits of vari-
ous potential vehicle improvements, along with their associated 
costs and risks.  
7.3 Range Safety Constraints (Early-in- 
Ascent and Downrange) 
The Range Safety organization at the Eastern Space and Mis-
sile Center, Patrick AFB, Florida, has a mandate to fly any mis-
sion with minimum risk to people on the ground. They are 
fundamentally involved with evaluating the launch space from 
early in the mission planning process, and they make the final 
decision on the acceptability of planned launch trajectories. The 
launch space may be complex with mission advantages being 
weighed against varying risks. There are several areas of Range 
Safety’s responsibilities which are directly affected by trajec-
tory design. Two of these areas are the early-in-ascent over-
flight of land masses while jettisoning hardware during nominal 
flight and the instantaneous impact points (IIP) of debris in the 
event of a catastrophic failure.  
In some cases, the thrust vector had to be constrained to the 
launch azimuth plane to satisfy Range Safety overflight of popu-
lated land mass constraints. Some missions had final inclinations 
which optimally required launch azimuths north of 35° or south 
of 108°. These limits were imposed because as seen in the vehicle 
description: booster engines, insulation panels, nose fairing, and 
the sustainer were jettisoned early-in-ascent. Without constraint, 
these jettisoned hardware posed threats to the islands in the Car-
ibbean or even the South American mainland. The vehicle was 
only allowed to yaw north or south when these hardware items 
had been safely separated. DUKSUP accommodated this con-
straint through fixed launch azimuth control and specifying when 
in the CoV out of plane steering was permitted. Only in a latter 
version of the code was a variable launch azimuth capability in-
corporated (see Sec. 11.10). Figure 14 illustrates a DUKSUP-
generated IIP for the Cassini launch (early in ascent) designed to 
skirt the Range Safety destruct lines protecting the Caribbean is-
lands and the coastline of Brazil (Ref. 13). 
Another Range Safety constraint was sometimes imposed on 
the IIP’s. In maximizing payload, the ground track frequently 
passed over the budge of Africa (Liberia). By constraining the 
trace to pass south of that bulge, the probability of impacting 
Africa was reduced with little loss of payload. Consequently, 
the Range asked us to examine the payload penalty for moving 
a GSO IIP trace south to reduce its dwell time over Africa. By 
moving the launch azimuth south to ~ 98° (rather than ~ 92°), 
and constraining the thrust vector to be in the launch azimuth 
plane until sometime in the Centaur burn, the IIP was moved 
about 150 miles off the African “bulge” (see Figure 15) 
(Ref. 14). Dwell time over Africa was reduced from about 
10 sec to 1 sec (i.e., the trans-Africa overflight only) (see  
Figure 16) (Ref. 8). The cost in payload penalty was only about 
5 to 10 lb (Ref. 8). Though the penalty was noticeable, it was 
accepted and other remaining variables were re-optimized to 
accommodate this constraint. Project management decided that 
this loss was justified by the reduction in Range Safety risk. 
DUKSUP did not have IIP as part of the variational optimiza-
tion, though it could have been incorporated in principle. The 
Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite (CRRES) 
mission of 1990 did use the ground tracking station constraint 
to indirectly “steer’ the trajectory so that the IIP fell outside the 
150 nmi limit off the African bulge (see Figure 15) (Ref. 14). 
Though it was a ‘work-around’ approach, it did match contrac-
tor simulations quite closely. 
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Figure 14.—DUKSUP IIP Data for Early Flight Phases of Cassini and Range Safety Destruct Lines 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.—DUKSUP IIP Data for CRRES Near African Bulge 
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Figure 16.—Centaur IIP Data Near Africa (Flight Time Shown in Seconds) 
 
7.4 Ascension Island Tracking 
Before the Apollo program was terminated, tracking ships 
were available to the Atlas/Centaur program to obtain telemetry 
data for the Centaur second burns by positioning a vessel within 
line-of-sight. But the ship was expensive. Advanced Range In-
strumentation Aircraft (ARIA) were not only expensive, but 
also unreliable, and the data was unavailable in real time. After 
Apollo was terminated, ARIA became the only option to obtain 
second burn data. (This was before the advent of Tracking Data 
Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)). We began to investigate 
whether it would be possible to reduce costs and/or risks by 
modifying trajectories. Ascension Island (in the south Atlantic) 
was available as a data recovery station, but for geostationary 
missions, it was not located such that the Centaur second burn, 
or indeed any part of the trajectory, was visible from the island. 
Obviously, if the Centaur and payload were placed in a high 
enough parking orbit, Ascension Island would be able to “see” 
it and receive the desired data, but the payload penalty would 
have been unacceptably high. Clearly, there was an optimum 
solution that would move the orbit nearer to Ascension Island, 
and would use a more elliptical parking orbit to raise the orbit 
altitude such that the vehicle could be seen. The only constraint 
on parking orbit would be the perigee altitude; the other orbit 
elements (apogee, argument of perigee, inclination, node, and 
injection true anomaly) would be free to be optimized to pro-
vide tracking from Ascension. The optimum solution would ex-
plicitly include a Centaur second burn tracking constraint. We 
implemented this change in the code and evaluated the resulting 
payload decrement. 
The project required data from 40 sec prior to Centaur second 
burn until 135 sec following the burn to observe Centaur shut-
down and spacecraft separation. These constraints would be ex-
plicitly imposed on a trajectory that began at liftoff and 
terminated at injection into the final GSO (i.e., the entire ascent 
was optimized from beginning to end). Imposing such a con-
straint was acceptable for GSO missions because the perfor-
mance penalty was small. It was not practical for some other 
missions because unfavorable geometry resulted in large per-
formance penalties. Geostationary orbit missions are circular at 
geostationary altitude and slightly inclined to the equator, either 
posigrade or retrograde, to minimize stationkeeping propellant 
usage over the spacecraft lifetime. The spacecraft solid motor 
burn could occur after more than one apogee passage (i.e., after 
several revolutions in the transfer orbit). All these factors were 
included in the optimum solution. Specifically, the tracking 
constraints were explicitly included in the CoV formulation of 
the problem. We constrained the trajectory such that the vehicle 
was 5° above the Ascension Island horizon from 40 sec before 
the second Centaur burn until after spacecraft separation. This 
required a slightly more southerly launch azimuth, a slightly 
more elliptical parking orbit, a slight increase in parking orbit 
inclination, and a slight change in parking orbit argument of 
perigee and node. Figure 17 illustrates several tracking-con-
strained and unconstrained trajectories, with the position of As-
cension Island noted in the bottom left corner. All of these were 
optimized to maximize payload. The penalty for the constraint 
was relatively modest since there were so many orbit character-
istics that could be “tweaked” to satisfy the constraint. A  
solution was obtained, and the result was that the tracking 
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Figure 17.—Ascension Island Tracking 
Constrained Trajectories 
 
requirements of the project could be met by constraining the 
trajectory with a reduction in payload of 29 lb (Ref. 8). 
By implementing this approach, the Atlas/Centaur project 
had a more reliable tracking option. Typically, we supplied con-
strained and unconstrained trajectories to the spacecraft project. 
If it was advantageous to them to give up a little payload to 
avoid the cost of the ARIA, they could make the decision. If the 
ARIA could be avoided, the cost of planning for and the use of 
the ARIA could be avoided. The spacecraft project was usually 
willing to forego 29 lb of payload to avoid paying for the ARIA 
(Ref. 8). This trajectory design was implemented in the Centaur 
guidance equations by employing two targets, one at the end of 
the first Centaur burn and the second at the end of the second 
Centaur burn. These trajectories were flown many times, and 
the predicted payload penalty was verified by flight experience. 
In addition, verification of the tracking constraint was demon-
strated by the availability of real-time tracking and telemetry 
data from Ascension at precisely the predicted times.  
7.5 Elliptical Parking Orbits 
The characteristics of the trajectory to circular parking orbit 
suggested that, perhaps, a circular parking orbit was not opti-
mum even for GSO missions, or maybe, for any two-burn mis-
sions. The altitude plot versus time of the Atlas/Centaur had a 
“roller coaster” characteristic, i.e., the vehicle climbed above 
the desired final injection altitude and then dived, permitting the 
addition of ∆V at higher velocity, the most efficient way to in-
crease energy. Further, forcing the flight path angle at burnout 
to be zero was not optimum. A trajectory with simply a perigee 
altitude constraint on the parking orbit was obtained and, sur-
prisingly, the payload benefit to GSO was 30 lb (a significant 
increase for Centaur GSO missions). The payload increase was 
significantly more for two-burn interplanetary missions (for 
some missions (Mars Observer) 100’s of pounds were gained). 
The parking orbits were slightly elliptical with apogee altitudes 
of ~ 130 nmi and perigee altitudes at 90 nmi (Ref. 8). The apo-
gee varied somewhat with the missions and the length of the 
coast. Again, this was “free” payload. There was no cost to the 
project and no added risk. All that was required was to optimize 
the orbit elements of the parking orbit for each mission, which 
was a trivial effort using a CoV code like DUKSUP. 
Directly related to this was the how the perigee heating con-
straint was incorporated. After inspecting the qV at perigee of 
the parking orbits and transfer orbits for GSO missions, where 
the perigee of the parking orbit was constrained to be 90 nmi, 
we noted that the qV at perigee of the parking orbit was lower 
than the qV at perigee of the transfer orbit. This was clearly the 
result of the great difference in the relative velocities at perigee 
of the two orbits. After further examination of qV, it was found 
that if the perigee constraint for the elliptical parking orbit were 
reduced to 80 nmi, the qV at perigee of the parking orbit was 
approximately equal to the qV at perigee of the transfer orbit 
(Ref. 8). The perigee of the transfer orbit had to be constrained 
to 90 nmi to maintain the qV. This was implemented and be-
came standard for such missions, since it added no complexity 
to the mission planning, no changes to the vehicle guidance 
software, and added no risk to the mission. Approximately 30 lb 
was added to the payload in GSO, at essentially no cost. 
7.6 Full Centaur Tanks or Fixed Initial 
Weight 
DUKSUP could be run in two distinct ways with respect to 
Centaur propellant loading. To maximize the payload for any 
specified mission target (which was supplied by the spacecraft 
project), the lift-off weight was varied until all the usable Cen-
taur propellants were consumed to achieve the target. Usable 
Centaur propellants were determined by adding the propellant 
“burned,” the flight performance reserve (however that was cal-
culated), and any additional reserves. Filling the Centaur tanks 
was performed by varying the lift-off weight until the desired 
Centaur propellant load (including reserves) was achieved. A 
simple iteration was employed to fill the tanks. DUKSUP could 
also be run where the spacecraft weight was fixed (as was in 
fact the entire liftoff mass of the Atlas/Centaur stack), and the 
amount of propellant excess was then calculated. The first tech-
nique was useful early in the study phase of a mission, while 
the latter was used during the year or so preceding launch where 
the mission design was mature, spacecraft design was finalized, 
and hardware was being manufactured.  
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8.0 The Hardware Platforms 
The computers on which DUKSUP resided are an important 
part of the story. As was discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, the 
structure of DUKSUP and how it operated was driven dramati-
cally in the early years by the computer’s limitations of that era. 
Table 3 contains some comparison data for the mainframes on 
which DUKSUP ran. Data is from various sources including 
recollections from individuals, the manufactures, and third par-
ties (Refs. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20). After computers memory 
and speed surpassed the primary needs of the user running the 
code (i.e., there was not much practical difference to a User if a 
run took 1 or 0.1 sec), the ever-increasing capabilities of the 
machines mattered only to unique tasks (like the multiple revo-
lution Shuttle/Centaur missions with the need for 1,000’s of 
runs per mission). It was never judged to be worthwhile to re-
structure DUKSUP to take advantage of the immense capabili-
ties on the new machines during the end of its use in the 1990s, 
though some preliminary planning did take place at that time 
for creating a new CoV trajectory optimization code not based 
on DUKSUP. 
8.1 IBM 704 and 7094 
The computer available to us in the spring of 1962 was an 
IBM 704, which had an 8,000 36 bit word memory. That was 
totally inadequate to the task at hand. Sometime after that LeRC 
got an IBM 7094, which had a 32,000 36 bit word memory 
(Figure 18) (Ref. 21). We thought that we had died and gone to 
heaven. Even so, this computer was small and very slow. If we 
had had a larger and faster computer, our coding would have 
been much simpler and “rational”. Computer time was precious 
and our time almost worthless in comparison. We were fortu-
nate to get one or two, 2-min “runs” during working hours. You 
might get a 5 min run during the day and one 20 min run at 
night. Punch cards were the only means of accessing the com-
puter. A key-punch error might be hard to find and lose us a day 
or two of access. Again, access to the machine language dumps 
was invaluable for finding errors. An advantage of the situation 
was that we had a lot of time to think and to plan our machine 
submittals. The environment precluded “shot gunning” a prob-
lem. Computer time and access demanded that we make the best 
use of the time and limited availability of the machine.  
8.2 UNIVAC 1100/42 
Purchased in 1975, the UNIVAC 1100 was a marked im-
provement over its predecessor for DUKSUP. LeRC continued 
to run DUKSUP on this mainframe until 1982. 
8.3 IBM 370/3033 
Acquired in 1980, this mainframe had a TSS/370 operating 
system running on an IBM 3033 hardware platform, arguably 
the most capable machine available at the time. Figure 19 is a 
photo of the IBM 370 operator’s console and tape drives at 
LeRC. It was the replacement for the IBM 360/67 which had 
been in use from 1966 to 1980. DUKSUP was brought up to run 
on this mainframe from the UNIVAC 1100. This was done after 
converting UNIVAC symbol codes to IBM symbol codes by 
way of manipulation of the INPUT subroutine to recognize the 
IBM machine language.4  
 
 
Figure 18.—IBM 7094 
 
 
TABLE 3.—CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPUTER MAINFRAMES WHICH RAN DUKSUP 
 IBM 704 IBM 7094 UNIVAC 1100/42 IBM 370/3033 Cray-1S Cray-XMP 
DUKSUP period (approximately) 1962 to 1964 ~1964 to 1975 1975 to 1982 ~1980 to 1983 1983 to 1988 1988 to 1998 
Number of words (memory) 8,000 32,000  64,000 Up to 4,000,000 Up to 8,000,000 
Bits per word (memory) 36 36 36 32 64 64 
Typical number of runs/day  1 to 2   100’s ~1,000 
CPU time /DUKSUP run  ~2 min   ~ 2 sec ~0.25 sec 
 
4 Personal communication/email with Wickenheiser, T.J., NASA 
GRC (retired). 
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Figure 19.—IBM 370/3033 at LeRC 
 
 
 
Figure 20.—Cray-1S at LeRC 
8.4 The Crays (1S and XMP) 
In the early 1980s, LeRC received its first supercomputer, the 
Cray-1S. Figure 20 is the Cray-1S at LeRC. Because of the 
Cray’s tremendous capability relative to other machines and job 
requirements, it was paired with the existing IBM 370 which 
then served as the Cray’s front end, prioritizing jobs and other-
wise interacting with its human users. Run times shortened dra-
matically and quantity of runs increased exponentially. A 
typical Shuttle/Centaur run (which lacked an atmospheric por-
tion) took ~ 2 sec of CPU time. Now 100’s of runs could be 
done during the day; in the evening, 1,000’s. The Cray-1S’s 
64 bit words challenged the need for double precision 
FORTRAN variables and operations.  
 
Figure 21.—Centaur Missions by Destination 
 
 
 
In the late 1980s, another upgrade arrived. The Cray-XMP 
brought still more speed and memory. Now an Earth to orbit 
trajectory run was of the order of ¼ sec of CPU time. It was 
likely that 1,000’s of trajectory runs could have been done with 
this mainframe during the work day. But unlike the multiple 
revolution problems associated with Shuttle/Centaur, the nature 
of the more-traditional ELV missions did not command that 
type of effort. Other still faster mainframes came afterwards to 
LeRC (Cray-YMP and Convex) and then the first of the work-
stations (Sun), where DUKSUK took longer to execute but the 
user wait queue was shorter. The workstations brought the op-
portunity to restructure DUKSUP into various versions which 
could be separately and more efficiently compiled and linked 
for the ever increasing variety of launch vehicles LeRC was 
supporting during the 1990s. Despite these changes, the last 
mission to rely on DUKSUP and which actually launched (Cas-
sini to Saturn) used the Cray-XMP.  
9.0 The Missions 
9.1 Overview 
LeRC launched 80 Centaurs from 1963 through 1997. Except 
for the earliest missions, NASA LeRC management relied on 
DUKSUP for trajectory design and optimization for 65 of those 
flights (>80 percent). Figure 21 illustrates the breakdown by 
mission destination for Centaur. Over half of these missions 
DUKSUP analyzed were geostationary, with interplanetary as 
the next largest destination. Figure 22 is a list of all missions 
which flew in which trajectories designed with DUKSUP were 
utilized. The following is a brief description of how these mis-
sion types influenced DUKSUP operation.  
NASA/TM—2015-218753 29 
9.2 Early Mission Types Not Supported by 
DUKSUP (R&D Test Flights and  
Surveyor’s Lunar Missions) 
Before any operational missions, a series of seven test flights 
were flown by LeRC following MSFC’s failure of F-1 (Ref. 5). 
These flights were Earth orbital with a single Centaur burn (ex-
cept for the last two). General Dynamics, having done trajectory 
design for its Atlas ICBM program, continued in its role for the 
research and development test flights and the Surveyor mis-
sions, as LeRC capability was not yet in place. Most of these 
were single burn flights. These did not require the more com-
plex trajectory planning for parking orbits, nor restart of the 
RL10 engines, and thus were inherently easier to perform. The 
test flights either lacked any payload (i.e., engineering instru-
mentation only) or carried a dummy payload mass simulator. 
Four of the seven test flights were successful. 
When the Atlas/Centaur was assigned to LeRC in the fall of 
1962, it had only the one operational mission assigned to it—
the Surveyor series to soft land the first U.S. spacecraft on the 
Moon. Data gathered by Surveyor in situ was fundamental to 
the successful design of the Lunar Module used in the manned 
landings to follow. Surveyor launches took place between June 
1966 and January 1968, and all seven were successful. 
9.3 Geostationary Orbit (GSO) Missions  
As was comprehensively discussed in the Section 5.2. but not 
repeated here, GSO missions are characterized by two coast pe-
riods—a relatively short one (~15 min) to the equator and the 
other longer one (~5¼ hr) from LEO to geostationary altitude—
punctuated by two Centaur burns and a solid rocket motor kick 
stage to circularize at GSO (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). From 
an engineering perspective, these nonplanar, geocentric trajec-
tories were much more complex that the preceding Surveyor 
lunar missions. It was for these missions DUKSUP was devel-
oped to perform the trajectory design and performance analysis.  
In total, Atlas/Centaur launched 42 missions to geostation-
ary/geo-transfer orbit (GTO) (overwhelmingly for the commer-
cial Intelsat series, but also the other series, such as 
FLTSATCOM, Comstar, GOES, and ATS spacecraft).6 
Though representing a majority of the Centaur missions sup-
ported by DUKSUP (52 percent), the GSO missions had fairly 
routine trajectories which did not change much from launch-to-
launch. The final targets used in DUKSUP were GSO energy 
and radius, a zero flight path angle, and zero inclination. The 
intermediate constraints imposed were sometimes radius, ve-
locity, and sine of flight path angle; though with the increased 
usage of elliptical parking orbits, this was relaxed to a single qV 
constraint represented by a corresponding minimum radius of 
the parking orbit (see sections VII.B. and VII.E.). The duration 
of at least four (and sometimes five) phases of flight were opti-
mized: the parking and transfer orbit coasts, and all Centaur 
burns (for Atlas/Centaur: 2, for Titan IV/Centaur and Shut-
tle/Centaur: 3).  
One new major complexity to GSO and Molniya (somewhat 
similar to GTOs; highly elliptical, greatly inclined, and with 
specific arguments of perigee) missions (as well as interplane-
tary, see Sec. 9.4) occurred during the preparations for the Shut-
tle/Centaur G vehicle. Though never flown, these missions 
would have had to contend with multiple deployment revolu-
tion impacts to nodal regression, where even an on-time launch 
could still be penalized if deployment occurred on a later than 
planned revolution (see Sec. 6.3).  
9.4 Interplanetary Missions 
Centaur launched 17 interplanetary missions during LeRC’s 
tenure. Every planet in the solar system was visited by a Cen-
taur from a LeRC-led launch with the exception of Pluto.7 Fur-
ther, all first encounters with each planet were made by a 
Centaur-launched mission with the exception of Venus. In fact, 
with the exception of Mariners 2 and 4, every successful U.S. 
interplanetary mission until the late 1980s was launched on 
Centaur. Interplanetary missions were the second largest group 
(21 percent) of missions based on destination (see Figure 21). 
But unlike the GSO missions, they were anything but routine 
trajectories. Though their final targets in DUKSUP were always 
hyperbolic orbital energy (C3) and declination, their values 
were significantly different depending on their planetary tar-
gets, and even between the launch opportunities for the same 
mission. Figure 23 illustrates the hyperbolic flight path of the 
spacecraft following Centaur injection burn (Ref. 22). Also 
shown are the declination (δ) and right ascension (α) of the out-
going asymptote of the hyperbola. Like the Surveyors, the in-
terplanetary missions were high change in velocity (ΔV) and 
usually two burn (though some were single burn). The duration 
of three phases of flight were optimized: the Centaur burns and 
the intervening parking orbit coast. Relatively speaking, even 
though the hyperbolic targets changed due to the relative mo-
tion of the planets, these missions were simpler to model than 
GSO missions. 
 
5 Figure 21 “R&D” total includes one Titan IIIE/Centaur test flight 
which was analyzed by DUKSUP. 
6 The similar-to-GTO CRRES mission is included in this tally for 
convenience 
7 A Pluto flyby of a Centaur-launched (in January 2006) spacecraft 
will take place in July 2015, long after LeRC launch vehicle respon-
sibilities ended. 
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Figure 22.—Missions Which Utilized DUKSUP-Generated Launch Trajectories 
 
 
Figure 23.—Hyperbolic Geometry of an Interplanetary Escape Trajectory 
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Interplanetary missions in the late 1960s (Mariners 6 to 9 and 
Pioneers 10 and11) were launched by LeRC on Atlas/Centaur, 
but these were not initially analyzed with DUKSUP. Beginning 
in the 1970s, there were various interplanetary missions follow-
ing NASA’s decision to integrate the Centaur with the USAF’s 
Titan IIIE booster and continue the Atlas/Centaur even though 
the Space Shuttle decision was looming in the near future. 
DUKSUP was then modified to support Titan. After the single 
test flight, all of the six Titan IIIE/Centaur missions were inter-
planetary: two launches of the Viking orbiter/lander mission to 
Mars (targeted for landing in 1976—200 years after the Decla-
ration of Independence), two launches of Helios for the Ger-
mans into heliocentric orbit, and two Voyager missions to 
Jupiter and Saturn (and later on to Uranus and Neptune). Other 
Atlas/Centaur missions such as Mariner 10, the two Pioneer Ve-
nus, and SOHO launches followed and were supported by 
DUKSUP (see Figure 22). The last interplanetary mission for 
LeRC-led Centaur was the Cassini mission to Saturn—the larg-
est launch vehicle and largest spacecraft ever launched by 
LeRC. Of the 17 missions, 16 were successful.8  
There were other interplanetary missions which were within 
only four months of launch, yet never flew on their intended 
launch vehicle. They were manifested on the new Shuttle/Cen-
taur vehicle. The Galileo mission to Jupiter and solar polar 
Ulysses mission were to use Shuttle/Centaur to place these high 
C3/heavy payloads on “fast” trajectories to Jupiter (Ulysses 
used it for gravity assist out of the ecliptic plane). In addition, 
the Mars mission Magellan was also slated to fly on the smaller 
version of the Shuttle/Centaur (see Sec. 6.3). 
Unlike most Earth-orbital missions, the use of the Shuttle in-
troduced a new variable: which orbit the Centaur and payload 
could be separated from the Orbiter (multi-revolution deploy-
ment). Since the Shuttle was in a LEO, the node was constantly 
regressing, significantly altering the initial state vector for the 
analysis. The optimum right ascension of the ascending node had 
to be first calculated, then fixed for the targeted deployment rev-
olution. For the escape missions, Shuttle launch time and azimuth 
took on added importance. This was accommodated by numeri-
cally integrating the Shuttle coast orbit and optimizing the burn 
time of the Centaur stage. To obtain a launch window, the injec-
tion right ascension was varied around the optimum to assess the 
penalties for launch windows. Delayed deployment meant a mis-
alignment of the right ascension of the ascending node (RAAN) 
of the outbound hyperbolic asymptote. This drove the DUKSUP 
analysis for the first time to multiple launch window analysis, 
where inertial targets had to be updated for each run and RAAN 
had to be modeled to generate the launch windows.  
After the Challenger accident of January 28, 1986 (about four 
months prior to the planned launch date for the first missions: 
Galileo and Ulysses), it was clear that any reduction in Shuttle 
8 The failure of the sole test flight of the Titan IIIE/Centaur is tallied 
under “R&D”. 
lift capability due to the accident would preclude doing any of 
the missions planned for the Shuttle/Centaur combination. On 
June 19, 1986, the Shuttle/Centaur project was cancelled. All 
missions were re-assigned to other vehicles. 
Finally, one aspect of the interplanetary missions (and some 
of the Earth orbital missions as well) was that LeRC manage-
ment usually provided a guarantee of performance to the space-
craft project office at other Centers (JPL in the case of the 
Mariner missions and Ames in case of the Pioneer missions). 
The LeRC Center Director signed a letter to the spacecraft pro-
ject guaranteeing the payload weight to a specified target such 
that the spacecraft project could proceed with spacecraft devel-
opment. The implication of these letters could be immense: they 
fundamentally drove major decisions on spacecraft valued in 
the multi-$100’s M range (and a launch vehicle of comparable 
cost). DUKSUP was the analytic tool used to calculate that 
guarantee. Around this way of doing business evolved a culture 
at LeRC of how performance analysis should be done, how var-
ious margins should be accounted for, that analysis ground rules 
be explicitly specified, the way nominal vs. dispersed values 
should be handled, and that performance guarantees should be 
made with “3σ” confidence. These engineering design philoso-
phies were consistent with similar USAF methods, and as the 
commercial launch world developed they were continued.  
9.5 LEO Missions  
Because Atlas/Centaur was designed for demanding missions 
(high energy and/or high mass), there were very few LEO mis-
sions which it performed unless unusual circumstances war-
ranted it. Thus, there were only six LEO missions which 
Centaur flew and DUKSUP modeled. These missions were the 
three Orbiting Astronomical Observatories (OAO A, B, and C) 
and the three High Energy Astronomical Observatories (HEAO 
A, B, and C). OAO required a relatively straight forward mis-
sion design using a single Centaur burn with a very high altitude 
requirement, between 400 to 500 nmi. This required a long, 
steep climb by Centaur. Trajectory design for the HEAO mis-
sions, however, was a much more complex (see Sec. 11.6). 
9.6 Studies: Rendezvous Missions 
In the years leading up to Space Shuttle operations, NASA de-
cided to turn over the Atlas/Centaur vehicle to its manufacturer 
General Dynamics and to abandon the Titan IIIE/Centaur. All 
NASA flights were then planned for the Shuttle, regardless of 
technical or cost trades. DUKSUP had no utility for the Shuttle 
ascent phase, which was viewed as the replacement for expenda-
ble launch vehicles by decree from HQ. Our mission design staff 
was once again assigned to support the Propulsion Research Di-
vision. However, DUKSUP was modified to perform unique 
studies starting from LEOs to support that organization. 
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One area of interest was assessing the propulsion options for 
raising the altitude of a very flexible space platform. Since such 
a flexible platform requires very low thrust for orbit raising, eval-
uating the performance of low thrust orbit raising propulsion sys-
tems was required. DUKSUP lent itself to that, especially in the 
regime between high thrust chemical systems and very low thrust 
electric propulsion solutions. DUKSUP with its analytical partial 
derivatives was able to cover most of this gap—the remainder 
was assessed with a low thrust orbit raising code. 
The other area of interest was the development of reusable 
space tugs. DUKSUP was again modified, this time to solve the 
rendezvous problem: from Shuttle orbit, to a higher orbit (typi-
cally geostationary) to deliver a payload, and return to the Shut-
tle. This would have been a trivial problem except that the node 
of the Shuttle’s LEO was regressing. (The tug’s node was 
changing little since its transfer orbits had significantly greater 
semi-major axes.) For rendezvous, the final node of the tug or-
bit had to coincide with that of the Shuttle’s. This could only 
reasonably be accomplished by introducing a burn near the an-
tinode of the returning orbit. DUKSUP was able to optimally 
introduce that fifth burn and determine optimum payload for the 
propulsion system being evaluated. Further, the experience 
gained with the effects of higher order harmonics of the gravity 
model on such trajectories was crucial to obtaining solutions to 
complex, multiple-burn optimum trajectories for the analysis of 
round-trip missions by space-tugs. This rendezvous version of 
DUKSUP was the basis for another version of the code years 
later (see Sec. 6.3). 
9.7 Studies: LEO Missions Supporting Space 
Station 
Beginning in 1992, LeRC was asked to support planning for 
International Space Station assembly and support. In addition to 
the assumed Shuttle and Russian Soyuz usage, there were other 
options to be considered: Titan IV/Centaur and Russia’s Proton. 
LeRC had already modeled the Titan IV/Centaur in DUKSUP as 
a candidate for launching some of the spacecraft lacking a ride 
after Challenger’s last flight. New DUKSUP runs were made to 
assess the suitability of domestic vehicles for Space Station de-
velopment and support. They could have been used to launch sta-
tion modules—or at least as a backup for the Shuttle in case of 
another Shuttle failure. The Proton was used to launch the Rus-
sian modules which were the first parts of the station, and could 
have also been used as a Shuttle backup. However, following the 
LeRC analysis, these domestic vehicles were discarded for two 
reasons. First, they would have had to be human-rated to send 
astronauts to station in case of another Shuttle failure (as was the 
case with Columbia in February 2003). But the United States 
could have avoided being dependent on the Russians for years 
had a realistic assessment of Shuttle reliability been made and 
prudently provision for domestic backups. Second, the full cost 
of the commercial, domestic vehicles always appeared unattrac-
tive compared to the U.S. government-run Space Shuttle and 
the government-subsidized foreign launch vehicles. 
10.0 How DUKSUP Was Used 
DUKSUP was used for several purposes by NASA’s expend-
able launch vehicle program leadership and LeRC manage-
ment. DUKSUP was an analytic tool independent of the 
contractor’s at the most fundamental level—the nature of the 
algorithm. Because of this, and its validation from the actuals 
from post-flight analysis, several types of analyses could be 
confidently performed by NASA independent of the contractor. 
It also provided a means to measure both generic and mission 
peculiar changes. Because if its pedigree, it was regularly called 
upon to assist contractors in mission peculiar flight software de-
sign and the user community in preliminary mission studies.  
10.1 Independent Check of Contractor High 
Fidelity Analysis 
DUKSUP was a high fidelity 3D performance and trajectory 
optimization code whose primary purpose was to access various 
technical matters surrounding how the launch vehicle flew. Alt-
hough it could be used for broad, low fidelity mission studies 
for potential missions, DUKSUP was not built for (it nor was it 
easy to use for) such applications. The code produced data 
which was generally used in the following analysis areas: Per-
formance, Trajectory Design, Launch Window, Range Safety, 
and Ground Tracking Station Coverage. 
10.1.1 Performance Analysis 
Performance analysis was the primary product of DUKSUP. 
Performance analysis meant quantifying how much spacecraft 
mass could be delivered to a particular orbit. Because DUKSUP 
could calculate vehicle performance to the same accuracy and 
precision (and arguably better) as the contractor, and doing so 
through a trajectory optimization algorithm which was funda-
mentally different from the contractors’, it provided NASA en-
gineers and management confidence and certainty in this 
critical area of launch vehicle development, integration, and 
launch. This meant LeRC was not dependent on accepting the 
contractors’ analyses at face value. Further, government engi-
neers frequently did analysis in advance of the contractor 
(sometimes before the business contract was in place), support-
ing NASA planning and guiding the subsequent contractor ef-
forts to support launch. 
The steps in performance analysis consisted of: 
 
• Modeling the launch vehicle operation through an input file 
• Modifying DUKSUP if necessary to accommodate the 
vehicle definition or the problem to be solved 
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• Performing the 3D run 
• Analyzing the results 
• Providing them to the contractor and payload user, delib-
erating on how to use the data 
• Determining the next steps 
 
The last two parts were done in the venue of the “Performance, 
Trajectory, and Guidance” (P, T, & G) working group, some-
times chaired by LeRC, other times co-chaired with the space-
craft center. It was this close collaboration and sharing of job 
responsibilities which was a real strength of the LeRC-approach 
to launch vehicle program management. It meant, among other 
things, that civil servants—frequently those chairing and man-
aging the technical work—had firsthand experience in what 
they were managing. 
Typical performance analyses applications included:  
 
• Verification of current mission nominal performance (ge-
neric and mission peculiar) 
• Maintenance and verification of benchmark performance 
(see Sec. 10.2), including interface control documents (ICD) 
• Performance impacts of vehicle hardware modifications, 
flight operations changes, or anticipated hits 
• Performance partials (sensitivities to changes) 
• Calculation of performance margins (Flight Performance 
Reserve (FPR), Launch Vehicle Contingency (LVC), and 
Launch Time Reserve (LTR) 
• Assessment of contractor performance documents (i.e., 
the Horses, Ponies, and Colts) 
• Performance assessments of major reviews 
• Launch support: Firing Tables, updates prior to day-of-
launch updates, ADDJUST support 
• Post-flight assessments, including mission success satis-
faction 
• Maintenance of NASA’s official repository for all ELV 
data, including performance comparison models for 
launch vehicles, ELV reference library, DUKSUP, and 
ELV reference guide 
• Feasibility assessments for future missions 
• Data for the official performance commitment letter from 
LeRC Center Director to Mission Program Manager 
 
Deserving of elaboration is the performance commitment letter 
of the last bulleted statement above. This letter was issued by the 
LeRC Center Director to the Program Manager of a new mission 
who had received Authority to Proceed. In it, a benchmark mis-
sion was specified (orbital elements, spacecraft weight, mission 
peculiar chargeable, launch date (if interplanetary), etc.). This 
was a guaranteed performance which LeRC provided the space-
craft project in the form of a signed letter by the LeRC Center 
Director. These DUKSUP-generated data were trusted by HQ. 
Should the launch vehicle loose capability to the point where it 
could no longer perform to the value specified in the letter, it 
would be LeRC’s responsibility to spend whatever funding, ac-
commodate whatever schedule (but still make the launch date), 
and provide the necessary people to satisfy what was defined in 
the letter. Further, it was LeRC’s policy to guarantee “3σ” (i.e., 
~99.87 percent) performance to the spacecraft organization, un-
like the increasingly common specification of “confidence lev-
els” of programs today. This meant that a flight performance 
reserve (FPR) had to be calculated statistically from all known 
dispersion sources. Thus the performance commitment agree-
ment LeRC entered into had major implications for the spacecraft 
mission, the launch vehicle contractor, and for the reputation of 
LeRC. A lot of effort was always placed on the DUKSUP analy-
sis, which was at the center of this performance agreement, and 
the analysis was never wrong. 
10.1.2 Trajectory Design 
Intimately tied to performance analysis was trajectory design. 
Indeed, the trajectory optimization produced the performance 
data. As was discussed in Section 7.0, the trajectory DUKSUP 
designed satisfied all intermediate constraints, achieved the fi-
nal orbit conditions, and maximized performance. Section 10.3. 
discusses how DUKSUP was called upon to design trajectories 
which sometimes exceeded the contractors’ abilities. “Shooting 
matches” were sometimes performed where LeRC and contrac-
tors attempted to reconcile differing results, comparing trajec-
tories (sometime phase by phase), in order to understand why 
different results were occurring. This helped find errors that one 
party might have made or potential advantages of the optimiza-
tion which one party might not have noticed. Sometimes, over-
looked constraints or misunderstandings between the user, 
contractor, and/or LeRC were discovered during the trajectory 
design analysis. Figure 24 is an excerpt from a DUKSUP tra-
jectory output file for a Titan IV/Centaur trajectory to GSO. 
10.1.3 Launch Window Analysis 
The launch window can be a function of many things: sun 
lighting constraints, cooling constraints (eclipse), Earth relative 
orbit element satisfaction of experiment criteria, performance 
limitation (interplanetary target), and others. For a launch win-
dow constrained by performance, as was usually the case for 
interplanetary missions, numerous DUKSUP runs were used to 
generate the definition of the daily launch windows. Figure 25 
is an example of an interplanetary launch window generated 
from DUKSUP output for the Cassini mission to Saturn via Ti-
tan IV/Centaur (Ref. 13) This meant running DUKSUP with 
varying hyperbolic targets (C3 and declination) for each day, 
and varying the right ascension to generate the window. Perfor-
mance penalties were then generated. Launch window analysis 
typically specified fixed window time lengths (such as the 
amount of propellant excess (PE) needed for a “1 hr window”) 
early in a missions’ design life. The process was then inverted 
closer to launch (how long each daily window could be based 
on whatever fixed PE was available).  
NASA/TM—2015-218753 34 
 
Figure 24.—Example DUKSUP Trajectory Output File (Initial Phases Only) 
 
 
 
Figure 25.—DUKSUP Launch Window Penalty Data for Cassini 
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10.1.4 Range Safety Analysis 
The Range required trajectories (nominal and dispersed) and 
the impact of hardware locations (both nominally and due to 
failure) from launch through orbit insertion. DUKSUP could 
calculate some, though not all, of these trajectory-related data 
which were eventually incorporated into the Range Safety Data 
Package generated by the contractor. Ground tracks were cal-
culated for the nominal ascent. Dispersed trajectories were not 
calculated, though they could be done if the modeling data were 
available. The instantaneous impact points (IIP) (the landing lo-
cations should thrust be terminated) of the vehicle were also 
calculated, though the error ellipses for jettisoned hardware 
were not. Figure 14 to Figure 16 are examples of IIP traces gen-
erated from DUKSUP output for early ascent, African bulge 
flyby, and continental African overflight. DUKSUP was not 
used for the related trajectory analysis (steepest lateral, steepest 
ascent, etc., and the tumbling turns). All of this analysis was 
used to support requests for flight plan approval, hazard analy-
sis, and day-of-launch Range Safety support.  
10.1.5 Ground Tracking Station Coverage Analysis 
Visibility by ground tracking stations worldwide during as-
cent and orbit was vitally important, particularly during mark 
events. DUKSUP calculated elevation and view angles from 
ground stations to the vehicle throughout the trajectory. Figure 
26 is an example of ground tracking station elevation angles for 
the CRRES mission on Atlas/Centaur (Ref. 14). Section 7.4 
also discusses how the code could optimally constrain the tra-
jectory to be within a specified angle to a specified tacking sta-
tion. This data was used by the LeRC launch vehicle program 
to ensure that telemetric data could be available for capture. It 
was also available to user community should health assessment 
or uplink capability be required.  
10.2 Benchmarking 
Closely related to Section 10.1.1 is benchmarking of perfor-
mance analysis. Although we used the capabilities of DUKSUP 
to provide management with the payload implications of impos-
ing constraints and trajectory modifications to improve perfor-
mance for specific missions, we also maintained what we called 
“benchmark” trajectories for each mission. These were used to 
readily track the payload impacts of launch vehicle changes. 
The benchmark trajectory was typically chosen to be repre-
sentative of the mission at the time the benchmark was estab-
lished. Inevitably, the real mission evolved over time, but the 
benchmark ground rules did not change. The stability of this 
benchmark trajectory allowed the engineers and management to 
track the impact of vehicle changes from a constant baseline. 
Otherwise, it would not have been possible to have a clear idea 
of the implications of the on-going vehicle changes, such as 
hardware weights, operational decisions, and vehicle improve-
ments. Such changes were constantly a part of the life of an on-
going launch vehicle project. In addition, we were always able 
to relate the implications of vehicle changes on the benchmark 
trajectory and payload to those on the current mission. 
 
 
 
Figure 26.—DUKSUP Tracking Station Coverage Data for CRRES 
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10.3 Assisting and Leading Contractors 
DUKSUP analysis was frequently used to assist launch vehi-
cle contractors in their trajectory design and flight software de-
velopment. Because of the close relationship LeRC staff had 
established and maintained with the contractors, particularly in 
the P,T, & G working group (in later years referred to as the 
Mission Design Panel), and because the software tools were of 
comparable pedigree and fidelity, trajectory optimization re-
sults were regularly shared and used during the preparation for 
launch. Sometimes, because CoV solutions guaranteed at least 
a local optimum, solutions could be found, which were difficult 
for (or sometimes even eluded) contractors to find with their 
codes (which were not CoV-based). Elliptical parking orbits 
(see Sec. 7.5), sub-orbital yaw for HEAO (see Sec. 7.6), and 
Galileo launch windows with combined Amphitrite/non-Am-
phitrite targets (see Sec. 11.8), were examples of this type of 
assistance provided to the contractors. The latter case actually 
resulted in a role reversal: where LeRC became the lead in cal-
culating and defining the daily launch windows while the con-
tractor checked the results.  
Still another type of assistance was applying lessons learned 
in support of one user to another, as was the case with geosta-
tionary missions and Pioneer Venus. The optimal parking orbit 
design first worked on and applied to geostationary missions 
(see Sec. 11.4) was also applied to other non-GSO missions. 
The Ascension Island tracking constrained trajectory was also 
made available to other users (see Sec. 11.10). 
10.4 Leading Edge Analysis for Yet to be 
Approved Missions 
DUKSUP was frequently called upon to determine the per-
formance capability and other mission trajectory related infor-
mation for proposed missions. Many of the missions in these 
pre-Phase A studies were never given Authority to Proceed. 
Some of the last leading edge mission studies the on-orbit deck 
SHUTSUP evaluated included the “Mariner Mark II” class of 
missions: Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby ((CRAF), Saturn 
Orbiter Titan Probe (SOTP), Main Belt Asteroid Rendezvous 
(MBAR), and Uranus Flyby Uranus Probe (UFUP). The Space 
Station assembly/resupply on domestic ELV’s (see Sec. 11.7) 
were another set of leading edge analyses performed on the 
then-new DUKSUP Titan IV/Centaur deck. These studies lev-
eraged the existing strong ties between LeRC and the user com-
munity in order to perform quality analysis required to enable 
HQ to make thoughtful and prudent decisions on how (or 
whether) to proceed with these conceptual missions which were 
usually poorly defined. DUKSUP was used to provide the best 
match of launch vehicle configuration to the mission, options 
on launch trajectory, and high quality performance data. Other 
assessments accompanied DUKSUP data, such as payload fair-
ing dimensional accommodation.  
Another variant of these activities were the post-Challenger 
studies of 1986 to 1988. Following the disaster, there were 
Shuttle/Centaur interplanetary missions which needed analysis 
for launch in later years (such as Galileo, Ulysses, Magellan), 
as well as other missions which were to become Shuttle refu-
gees in need of finding alternate rides (such as CRRES). LeRC 
performed these trajectory studies with DUKSUP in order to 
provide NASA HQ with a recovery plan during the 3 year down 
period following the Challenger disaster.  
10.5 Vehicle Performance Improvement 
Analysis for NASA 
DUKSUP was also called upon to assess the payload im-
provements to be derived from various improvements the 
launch vehicle. These improvements were in both hardware 
(discussed here) and software/analysis (Sec. 7.2). One user, In-
telsat—a profit making venture, was frequently interested in in-
creasing the payload capability of Atlas/Centaur to enable an 
increase in the weight of their spacecraft. We did studies to de-
termine the payload improvements associated with lengthening 
the Atlas tank to increase the propellant load. As the hardware 
group analyzed the structural and dynamic impact of Atlas tank 
lengthening, DUKSUP was able to quantify the payload im-
provements associated with the various options back to Intelsat. 
As a result, the Atlas was lengthened twice during LeRC’s ten-
ure leading launch vehicles. 
Other examples of these upgrades which were studied by 
DUKSUP and were implemented on the flight vehicle include: 
upgrading the Atlas booster MA-5 engine thrust, developing 
Centaur guidance of Titan IIIE booster, and improving the ISP 
of the RL-10 with a silver throat insert. There were other up-
grades which were also studied, but not implemented, such as 
adding fluorine to the oxygen in the Atlas tank. Though this 
study was done numerous times because of its initially-per-
ceived simplicity, the daunting operational problems could 
never be rationalized despite the significant performance  
improvement.  
11.0 Notable Impacts 
The following mini-case studies are examples of the signifi-
cant impact DUKSUP data had on either the launch it was sup-
porting, the launch vehicle program as a whole, or how the user 
community was able to improve the use of their spacecraft.  
11.1 Maximized Performance Obtained From 
the Variational Solution Improved  
On-Orbit Lifetime 
The ability to obtain all the performance available from the 
vehicle through the use of trajectories generated by DUKSUP’s 
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variational calculus algorithm proved to be extremely valuable 
to the Centaur program and to the users. At the time, GSO sat-
ellites were primarily limited in lifetime by the available sta-
tionkeeping propellants. Adding a few more pounds of 
propellants to the spacecraft tanks could add months, if not 
years, to the lifetimes of the spacecraft. Consequently, as the 
schedule moved from the initial planning to launch, the trajec-
tories were easily re-optimized several times to yield targets 
that would allow the spacecraft tanks to be loaded to the maxi-
mum payload available. Trajectories would be re-optimized just 
prior to flight to gain as few as five more pounds in orbit. In 
addition, even for interplanetary missions, increasing payload 
by only a few pounds could add lifetime to the spacecraft at the 
target planet. The cost to do this was trivial, and the benefits to 
the spacecraft could be financial, or could provide additional 
margin for spacecraft operational problems, or maneuvering 
flexibility, i.e., moving the spacecraft longitude in the case of 
the geostationary missions. 
The success achieved with these early mission designs led to 
a LeRC philosophy to make certain that trajectories were flown 
that would obtain all the payload available from trajectory op-
timization. The Atlas/Centaur and Titan/Centaur would go on 
to fly a wide variety of missions—and every mission was pro-
vided with the maximum payload available from the launch ve-
hicle. In the absence of the maximum payload, unnecessary 
compromises in the spacecraft would have meant potentially 
higher cost and increased risk. Similarly, in the case of the 
launch vehicle, the performance improvements available from 
hardware changes, such as lightening the vehicle or improving 
the propulsion, were always expensive and introduced risk. In 
many cases, the changes did not increase payload any more than 
some of the trajectory changes that we ultimately made. If hard-
ware changes were ultimately required, the project knew that 
there was no alternative. 
11.2 Communication Technology Satellite 
(CTS) 
In 1975 the Canadian Space Agency and NASA collaborated 
on launching an experimental high powered communications sat-
ellite to GSO. Shortly before launch, it was discovered that the 
Delta launch vehicle was short 10 lb of being able to launch the 
spacecraft. The options were to either increase the launch capa-
bility of the Delta by 10 lb or decrease the weight of the space-
craft by 10 lb. Increasing the performance of a launch vehicle 
would have been expensive and would incur risk. Decreasing 
hardware weight of the spacecraft was also expensive and risky 
so close to launch. Decreasing the spacecraft propellant to remain 
on station would compromise the mission and was also undesir-
able. Someone in the CTS project at LeRC was aware of the ca-
pabilities of DUKSUP and requested that we analyze the 
proposed trajectory and determine whether trajectory optimiza-
tion could pick up the needed payload. We went to Goddard 
Space Flight Center (GSFC) (which managed the Delta) to obtain 
a trajectory so that we could model and match the performance 
of the Delta, then use DUKSUP to optimize the trajectory to de-
termine whether any payload improvement was possible. We 
started with the Delta state vector at solid separation. Using the 
injection targets from the GSFC trajectory and matching perfor-
mance segment by segment, we obtained a trajectory that yielded 
the same performance as the GSFC trajectory. We then freed 
DUKSUP to optimize the trajectory. Payload increased slightly 
more than the 10 lb that was needed by optimizing the parking 
orbit elements, injection targets, and transfer orbit and final in-
jection strategy. The optimized trajectory was provided to GSFC 
and we understand that it was used for launch. 
11.3 Titan IIIE/Centaur Variable Launch Azi-
muth Decision 
For each of the Titan IIIE/Centaur missions in the 1970’s, the 
Titan phases of flight were steered by Centaur’s guidance rather 
than Titan’s. Centaur was capable of varying the launch azi-
muth as a function of time and date. While this made for a com-
plex and substantive amount of preflight trajectory analysis to 
be performed for Range Safety, it allowed for maximizing ve-
hicle performance for the six challenging missions Viking A 
and B, Voyager I and II, and Helios A and B. The Titan con-
tractor at that time could not perform a continuously variable 
launch azimuth analysis nor could they accommodate this steer-
ing within the existing flight software. But because Centaur 
flight software could, and DUKSUP performed the initial tra-
jectory design, the Titan IIIE/Centaur missions were able to 
successfully fly these complex trajectories. (Surprisingly, 20 
years later, this feat was shied away from by Titan IV/Centaur 
(where the Titan steered itself) despite LeRC’s successful anal-
ysis of viability and advocacy.)  
11.4 Optimal Parking Orbits 
When we began analyzing GSO missions, we assumed that 
the optimum parking orbit to be circular. The parking orbit al-
titude was selected to be 90 nmi above the equator. This altitude 
was selected to ensure that the instantaneous heating rate would 
be low enough such that no component of the Centaur or the 
spacecraft would be damaged by heating. 
By observing the characteristics of the Atlas/Centaur trajec-
tory into the parking orbit, we wondered why a circular orbit 
was optimum. The Atlas/Centaur tended to “rollercoaster” into 
the circular orbit—that is, the vehicle went above the circular 
orbit altitude and then dove slightly below the circular orbit be-
fore going into the circular orbit. This suggested to us that per-
haps a circular orbit was not optimum. DUKSUP was modified 
to put a single constraint on the parking orbit injection—perigee 
altitude. All the other orbit elements were optimized. This tra-
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jectory was obtained, checked for optimality, and the improve-
ment in payload was 29 lb. This improvement was certain, risk 
free, cost nothing, and was easy to implement. No hardware 
changes were required—the only change was to the parking or-
bit injection target. 
The spacecraft project sometimes wanted to wait until the sec-
ond apogee before injecting into the final orbit. DUKSUP could 
maximize the payload for this mission design ground rule with 
no problem. The payload weight would vary very little—the only 
difference would be the effect of oblateness for the longer coast 
which would have a slight effect on the optimization. 
In comparing the two trajectories—burn at first apogee and 
at second apogee—it was observed that the instantaneous heat-
ing rate at perigee of the 90 nmi altitude parking orbit was sig-
nificantly lower than the heating rate for the near 90 nmi perigee 
of the transfer orbit (Ref. 8). Further study indicated that the 
heating rate at perigee for an 80 nmi altitude parking orbit was 
very near the heating rate for perigee of the 90 nmi altitude 
transfer orbit. The trajectory generated by DUKSUP yielded an-
other approximately 30 lb of payload to GSO. The decision to 
use this trajectory was left to the spacecraft project. At this 
point, we were providing General Dynamics with the trajectory 
designs since they lacked the capability of optimizing these tra-
jectories. We provided the spacecraft project with trajectory op-
tions allowing the office to size the solid motor on the 
spacecraft to maximize payload. Just before launch, we incor-
porated all the final weights and the spacecraft motor character-
istics and re-optimized the trajectory. If the payload improved 
as much as 5 lb, we provided a final trajectory design such that 
the spacecraft project could take advantage of the additional 
payload. Post flight analysis verified the payload improvement. 
Another example of how DUKSUP was used to introduce op-
timal parking orbits was for the MO mission. A post 1986 Chal-
lenger-refugee, MO was manifested on Titan 3/TOS which had 
sufficient capability from Shuttle’s circular parking orbit. But 
DUKSUP determined that by using the full Titan III capability 
to inject into an elliptical parking orbit, performance could be 
improved by several 100’s lb (Ref. 8). However, the optimum 
parking orbit shape varied significantly from day to day, and 
during each daily window. So LeRC management elected to use 
a fixed, near-circular orbit because it provided acceptable pay-
load, was simpler, and could be accommodated by the TOS’s 
avionics suite. 
11.5 Propellant Settling During Coast 
Normally during Centaur coast periods, small settling motors 
were fired along the velocity vector for a short period of time af-
ter Centaur cutoff to settle the propellants, and then again for a 
period prior to Centaur second burn to position the propellants at 
the rear of the tank for engine start. These firing periods added a 
very small amount of energy to the orbit. However, DUKSUP’s 
CoV analysis revealed that the optimal direction for this propel-
lant settling thrust used during the parking orbit coast periods 
(just after the first Centaur burn) was actually an angle of ~180° 
with respect to the local horizontal (i.e., essentially a small retro 
burn). Then, at the end of the parking orbit coast, the optimal 
thrust angle would reverse until it was at a ~5° angle below the 
local horizontal at the beginning of the Centaur second burn. 
Analysis determined that if the thrust angle were allowed to be 
optimal, the payload gain was trivial (~ 1 to 2 lb) (Ref. 8). 
This result seemed counter-intuitive at first. The explanation 
was that the optimum solution lowered the altitude at initiation 
of the second burn, thus increasing the velocity. Adding ΔV at 
a higher velocity is a more efficient way to add orbital energy, 
thus increasing payload. This change was never implemented 
because fighting for a more sophisticated steering law during 
the coast was not worth the trouble for such a small payload 
gain. However, had it been worth even as little as 10 lb, we 
would have pushed for implementation. Although this approach 
was never pursued, we feel confident that only a CoV-based 
code like DUKSUP could have provided this insight. 
11.6 High Energy Astronomical Observatory 
(HEAO) Missions 
During 1977 to 1979, three unusual missions called the High 
Energy Astronomical Observatories (HEAO) were launched by 
Atlas/Centaur. Two of these missions (HEAO A and B) re-
quired circular orbits with altitudes between 230 and 260 nmi, 
at inclinations of ~22.75° to 23.5°. These low inclinations were 
desired to avoid the bulge in the Van Allen belts in the Southern 
Hemisphere (‘South Atlantic Anomaly’). There were several 
trajectory options to reach such a relatively low altitude and low 
inclination. Since CCAFS is at a latitude of 28.5°, it was neces-
sary to reduce the orbit inclination at some point in the trajec-
tory. It was apparent that the trajectory yielding the most 
payload was probably a three or more Centaur burn mission, 
where inclination reduction could occur near the equator and at 
a higher altitude. Although Centaur had demonstrated on an 
earlier mission that it could perform seven burns, the HEAO 
payload requirements were low enough that taking the risks of 
multiple restarts was deemed unnecessary by LeRC manage-
ment. Trajectories were then produced by DUKSUP for the 
two-burn Centaur missions, where the inclination reduction was 
done near the equator and the perigee of the parking orbit was 
significantly suborbital. These trajectories had the disadvantage 
that if the Centaur failed to ignite for the second burn, the space-
craft would immediately re-enter, a risk to be avoided. So direct 
ascent (i.e., one-burn) trajectories were investigated. These 
were selected since they had sufficient performance, although 
they were by far the most complex trajectories we ever designed 
and flew. To maximize payload, the optimum combination of 
four concerns had to be obtained: lofting to acquire the desired 
final altitude, reaching a lower latitude such that inclination 
could be reduced, minimizing the magnitude of the velocity 
vector that had to be “turned” to reduce inclination, and avoid-
ing dropping hardware on Venezuela and the islands of the  
Caribbean (see Figure 27). 
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Figure 27.—DUKSUP-Designed Unique Direct Ascent with Sub-Orbital Yaw (HEAO Mission) 
 
This requirement was an usual trajectory design challenge. 
Trying to obtain such a trajectory parametrically would have 
been daunting, if not impossible. To achieve a final inclination 
of 22.75° (i.e., less than the latitude of the Cape), the Centaur 
had to be at most at 22.75° latitude for a planar ascent. To reach 
that latitude limited by a relatively short burn arc, the vehicle 
had to get south as quickly as possible. This implied a very 
southerly launch azimuth. However, because of jettisoning 
hardware (booster engines, insulation panels, nose fairing, and 
sustainer stage) had to avoid the Caribbean islands and Vene-
zuela, the launch azimuth was limited, usually at most to 115° 
(a value ultimately determined by the Range). The trajectory 
was constrained to the launch azimuth plane (i.e., planar ascent) 
until the hardware was dropped. As soon as yaw was allowed, 
the vehicle had to yaw as quickly as possible. Absent these 
hardware footprint problems, the optimum launch azimuth 
would have been far south of an acceptable value. With the 
launch azimuth constraint, when the vehicle was finally allowed 
to yaw south, a large discontinuity in the thrust vector was  
required (over 30°). The Centaur had a limit of 2° per second 
on the rate of change of the thrust vector. In previous missions, 
discontinuities in the thrust vector had been very small and, for 
performance purposes, they were ignored. In this case, they 
could not be. Consequently, the constraint on the rate of change 
of the thrust vector was included in a new version of DUKSUP 
and optimum solutions were obtained. The resulting trajectory 
was unusual in that it demonstrated the optimum trade-off be-
tween getting south as soon as allowed, while minimizing the 
horizontal velocity vector at the end of the trajectory that must 
ultimately lie in the orbit plane. There was some payload pen-
alty, although not large. As soon as it was allowed, the vehicle 
yawed to the right (south) to reduce latitude. The thrust angle in 
yaw then moved smoothly back to the left until, at the end of 
the burn, the thrust was about 55° out of the plane of the orbit. 
To fly this trajectory, the Centaur guidance equations had to be 
significantly reformulated in yaw to mimic DUKSUP’s CoV 
solution. The yaw equations had to incorporate a bi-linear tan-
gent steering law, similar to the pitch equations. This was done, 
and the result was a flight trajectory for HEAO that matched 
DUKSUP’s solution, and yielded the maximum payload from 
the vehicle. This demonstrated again that, with appropriately 
sophisticated guidance and steering laws, the vehicle could fly 
a near CoV trajectory. 
Examination of the trajectory was fascinating as the instanta-
neous inclination of the orbit, vehicle latitude, the horizontal 
velocity, and altitude varied optimally to yield the best payload. 
To maximize payload, the trade-off between these contributions 
to the optimum solution are continuously changing and not lin-
early. For instance, it was advantageous to reach the orbit alti-
tude as soon as possible because the circular orbit velocity 
diminished as orbit altitude increased. However, to reach the 
required latitude, higher horizontal velocities were required. As 
the trajectory proceeded, the inclination increased as latitude 
was reduced. Finally it had to be decreased to 22.75°; however, 
as inclination was reduced, the velocity had to increase to cir-
cular orbit velocity at the altitude (Ref. 8). 
Intuition suggested that a two-burn solution would have 
yielded higher payload. To wit, putting the Centaur and payload 
in an 28.5° elliptical orbit with an optimum apogee altitude, per-
form the plane change to 22.75° and adjust the perigee to 
240 nmi and the argument of perigee to 0°, (that is the perigee 
of the elliptical orbit was over the equator), coasting to the equa-
tor and then circularizing. Almost certainly, this trajectory to 
the desired final orbit would have a higher payload than the one 
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burn solution. But we were discouraged from examining this 
potential improvement in payload since the one burn payload 
was sufficient. 
Finally, the low altitude and low inclination target benefited 
from the incorporation of a new technique called “in-flight re-
targeting.” This capability allowed an in-flight compromise in 
the target if an on-board calculation of performance indicated 
that the nominal target could not be achieved, and the vehicle 
would burn out suborbital as a result. This capability was a di-
rect result of the failure of AC-21, OAO-B, which burned out 
suborbitally trying to achieve the fixed target orbit. The users 
pre-agreed to a strategy for defining less demanding targets 
which were determined by the level of predicted performance 
deficiency. For example, achieving an altitude of 230 nmi, 
when the nominal was 240 nmi, could still result in a useful 
mission. An achieved, compromised target would have been 
better than a failed mission. Without triggering retargeting, the 
HEAO A and B missions were flown successfully to the desired 
final orbits. 
11.7 Voyager 
Two Voyager spacecraft were launched to Jupiter in 1977 on 
Titan IIIE/Centaur (TC). On the second Voyager launch (i.e., 
Voyager I; they were numbered based on Jupiter arrival dates, 
not Earth launch dates), TC-6, on 9/5/1977, the Titan core stage 
II experienced a hardware failure and shut down 544 ft/sec 
slower and 3,000 ft lower than nominal. Mission success de-
pended on the Centaur’s ability to make up for this huge energy 
shortfall. The failure occurred very early in the Titan core stage 
II burn, and soon after this the launch team was aware of the 
failure, based on real-time telemetry. To compensate for this 
energy deficiency, Centaur was required to burn longer than 
nominal for its first burn to parking orbit. There was great con-
cern that the Centaur would have sufficient remaining propel-
lants for its second burn to inject the Voyager spacecraft on the 
trajectory to Jupiter. However, with relatively simple calcula-
tions on slide rules, several members of the mission design team 
determined that Centaur would have enough propellants to 
make up this deficit (although barely). It did, and injected the 
Voyager I spacecraft successfully. Had the identical Titan fail-
ure occurred on the first launch (TC-7 with Voyager 2) the 
“Grand Tour” mission (Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune) 
would have been lost due to its more demanding launch geom-
etry (Ref. 8). Voyager II would likely have been rerouted to 
perform Voyager I’s mission (sacrificing flyby’s of the third 
and fourth planets). Figure 28 illustrates the Voyager 1 and 2 
heliocentric trajectories as a result of Centaur’s injection burns 
(also shown are illustrations of Voyager and its launch on Titan 
IIIE/Centaur). 
Three critical mission design points emerge from this experi-
ence. First, it proved essential to have obtained an optimum tra-
jectory design from lift-off through spacecraft solid motor burn, 
similar to the geostationary missions. Second, all the propellants 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28.—Heliocentric Trajectories of Voyager 1 and 2; Voyager and Titan IIIE/Centaur  
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held in reserve to compensate for 3σ in-flight performance dis-
persions were carried in the Centaur upper stage, with none car-
ried in any Titan stage. Third, the Centaur guidance and steering 
algorithms were sufficiently sophisticated to “redesign” the as-
cent trajectory after sensing the energy-deficient initial Centaur 
state vector. Voyager I is an example of where the optimum tra-
jectory design philosophy and flexible guidance software saved 
a “flagship” NASA mission, and provided a wealth of scientific 
knowledge that mankind would have had to wait decades to ob-
tain. DUKSUP was the essential part of the first point above.  
11.8 The 109 Percent SSME NASA HQ  
Decision for Galileo’s Launch Windows 
The Galileo mission to Jupiter, manifested for launch in May 
1986 on Shuttle/Centaur, was short on performance. Nine months 
before launch, the baselined 65,400 lb to LEO Shuttle lift com-
mitment allowed only a 14 day launch opportunity with daily 
windows less than 1 hr long, while simultaneously exhibiting a 
significant (and still unresolved) negative total system perfor-
mance margin. This was because of the demanding C3 targets and 
a Shuttle lift constraint which required a ~2400 lb propellant of-
fload on Centaur. A comprehensive analysis was performed us-
ing DUKSUP to illustrate how the opportunity could be enhanced 
if the Shuttle’s SSME’s were to be run at 109 percent throttle (a 
capability claimed as possible) enabling Centaur to have full pro-
pellant tanks. In the course of three days, DUKSUP, running on 
the then-state of the art Cray-1S supercomputer, calculated over 
15,000 optimized 3D trajectories based on a 67,750 lb to LEO 
capability a 109 percent SSME could enable (i.e., full Centaur 
tanks). The launch opportunities expanded from 14 days to 22 
days. The daily launch windows expanded from the marginal 
lengths of 30 to 50 min to the sufficient lengths of 90 to 130 min 
(see Figure 29). Just as importantly, the total system performance 
margin was resolved; changing from –168 lb of PE to +352 lb PE 
(Ref. 23). The analysis was presented to a HQ-level gathering, 
with the Associate Administrator (AA) for Space Flight presid-
ing. Also present were senior executives from LeRC, JPL, and 
the Code M Centers. Over the objections of the Code M Centers 
and Space Shuttle senior management, the AA decided to con-
firm the baseline of 109 percent SSME for Galileo (Ref. 24) be-
cause of the analysis generated from DUKSUP.9 However, the 
loss of the Challenger Space Shuttle, and the subsequent cancel-
lation of the Shuttle/Centaur program, rendered this decision 
moot. 
The other directly related accomplishment pertained to the 
analysis of the alternate Galileo targets for “second day deploy-
ment”. DUKSUP, along with a new standalone utility, was able 
to calculate launch windows of varying lengths and/or penal-
9 Nieberding, J.J., Personal communication, NASA LeRC (ret.) June 
2014; and prior discussions with lead author Spurlock, O.F. 
ties, both with and without alternate targets to the flyby of as-
teroid 29-Amphitrite (Ref. 23). Each set of daily performance 
curves had windows which frequently opened on one revolu-
tion/one target, and closed on a different revolution/different 
target (see Figure 30 for June 2, 1986). Because of how the first 
day Amphitrite targets were changing differently from the sec-
ond day non-Amphitrite targets, the day-by-day resultant win-
dow analyses turned out to be irregular data and difficult to 
analyze. But because of DUKSUP’s superior optimization ca-
pability and speed of the computer platform, these solutions 
were able to be discovered  
 
 
Figure 29.—DUKSUP Launch Opportunity for Galileo 
 
 
Figure 30.—DUKSUP Daily Launch Window 
Performance Penalties for Galileo 
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11.9 Generation of Data for AIAA  
International Reference Guide to 
Space Launch Systems Textbook 
In the 1990s, LeRC generated a prodigious amount of perfor-
mance data for the American Institute of Aeronautics and As-
tronautics (AIAA) for the comprehensive textbook comparing 
launch vehicles (national and international) on a common basis. 
This reference guide is now in its fourth edition and has grown 
to be a 500+ page tome. It is considered the go-to reference for 
launch vehicles, particularly performance data, short of com-
mitments from the vehicle providers. Though not generally 
acknowledged at the time, the second edition of this guide pub-
lished LeRC-generated data which was thoroughly docu-
mented, meticulously ground-ruled, and comprehensive in 
parametric form with data run by DUKSUP (Ref. 25). 
11.10 Pioneer Venus Mission and the Ascension 
Island Tracking Constraint 
Arguably the most challenging optimization problem ever 
faced by LeRC staff was the genesis of the most capable version 
of the code: SUPERDUK. This version was written for the Pi-
oneer Venus missions launched by Atlas/Centaur in 1978. 
There were two launches, an Orbiter in May and a multi-Probe 
in August. The launch of AC-50 of Pioneer Venus A is shown 
in Figure 31. Both of these launches were two burn, which 
meant that ARIA were used to provide Centaur second burn te-
lemetry coverage. It occurred to us that it might be possible to 
acquire the second burn telemetry coverage from Ascension Is-
land in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, as was possible with 
the GSO missions.  
SUPERDUK could optimize launch azimuth and trajectory 
lofting in order to (for the first time) produce launch day/launch 
time-varying interplanetary trajectories (Ref. 8). It also could 
constrain the Centaur second burn so it could be observed from 
Ascension Island (see Figure 17). This latter capability was 
similar to the launch time independent Intelsat mission trajec-
tories described earlier. If such trajectories could not be ob-
tained, it would be necessary to observe the second burn with 
ARIA, as the tracking ships were no longer available. In this 
formulation, the launch azimuth and the lofting of the trajectory 
would be optimized using CoV, not parametrically as had been 
done before. In addition to the Ascension constraint, the other 
constraints imposed were the qV’s for the panel and fairing jet-
tisons and the perigee of the parking orbit (Ref. 8). Filling the 
Centaur tanks was also included in the iteration, rather than per-
forming that as a separate part of the problem. The target for 
each trajectory was injection energy (C3) and the declination 
which were provided by the spacecraft project. The right ascen-
sion was optimized. The penalty for supplying a launch window 
was evaluated by varying the targeted right ascension about the 
optimum right ascension. Each day in the launch opportunity 
was evaluated separately since the target changed day-by-day. 
Optimum solutions were obtained, characterized by time de-
pendent launch azimuth, lofting, qV jettison times, and parking 
orbit elements. For every day in the opportunity, and for each 
launch time in the window of any day, the optimum trajectory 
was different (Ref. 8). Vehicle performance met the require-
ments of the spacecraft project, i.e., the vehicle could lift the 
spacecraft and place it on its path to Venus. However, this op-
timum mission design required a very complex Range Safety 
data package because the entire mission geometry was varying 
and doing so rapidly. In addition, the verification process would 
have been tedious, and SUPERDUK would have had to provide 
time dependent trajectory characteristics for every minute of 
every launch window for the entire opportunity (Ref. 8). 
 
 
Figure 31.—Launch of Pioneer Venus on AC-50 
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When these mission design results were presented to LeRC 
management, the decision was made to forgo the SUPERDUK 
analysis (Ref. 8). Rather, LeRC would use the aircraft to provide 
tracking, allowing much simpler trajectory profiles to be flown, 
although at the significant cost of the ARIA. Management rightly 
decided to go with the simpler solution, but at least they were 
shown what was possible in order to enable an informed decision. 
Use of the Ascension constrained trajectory would have put a 
considerable burden on General Dynamics to generate the trajec-
tories. Revisiting the question now, with currently available com-
puter resources, the tracking constrained trajectories would 
probably have been utilized. The results of the study showed that 
the Pioneer Venus missions could be launched with the Ascen-
sion constraint and meet the payload requirements. The study 
demonstrated that very complex, constrained trajectories could 
be produced with very little payload penalty, but operational con-
siderations precluded their use (Ref. 8). 
12.0 Other Contemporary 3D  
Trajectory Optimization Codes 
12.1 Observations 
The following are a few observations regarding optimization 
techniques. With the availability of large, fast computers over 
the last two decades, steepest descent optimization techniques 
with their flexibilities provide powerful tools for the studies de-
scribed. However, during the period of 1960s to 1980s, these 
machines were not available. One of DUKSUP’s standout traits 
was that because it was so tightly coded (because of the hard-
ware limitations), combined with CoV’s capability, it was able 
to produce such great answers so quickly (solutions that to this 
day may, in some cases, not be easily reproducible). Further, 
the use of such codes alone increases the possibility of obtain-
ing sub-optimal solutions because of large number of independ-
ent variables and the difficulty of “guessing” initial values. This 
is more of a problem with a steepest descent technique than it 
is with CoV formulations like that in DUKSUP (although such 
can happen in CoV codes as well). In addition, with any code, 
there is the danger that the analyst may not understand the lim-
itations of the codes used. We would suggest that a modern CoV 
trajectory optimization code be added to the NASA arsenal. It 
would provide a unique insight and understanding which are not 
readily apparent with most of the codes in use today. It may not 
provide the final precise answer, but it may reveal solutions not 
readily available to other techniques, such as the HEAO solu-
tions and the nonintuitive low thrust coast example discussed 
earlier. Finally, there is no substitute for careful examination of 
trajectories to make certain that there are no unintended con-
straints being imposed. The analyst must look for results that 
are nonintuitive (but could be important), and to the best of their 
abilities ensure that the optimum has been obtained.  
10 Williams, C.H., personal recollection, NASA LeRC, San Diego, 
California, c. 1989. 
None of DUKSUP’s contemporaries appeared to have the ca-
pability to call upon a CoV optimization technique. Though 
some had more than one optimization algorithm which could be 
selected, they were largely based on steepest descent or similar 
techniques. Anecdotal discussions with one of the other launch 
vehicle organizations regarding sensitivity of initial guesses 
suggested that almost any reasonable value supplied to the code 
would produce a converged solution.10 How close that solution 
was to an optimum, even a local optimum, appeared to be dif-
ficult to gage necessitating multiple runs around the solution to 
ensure that an optimum had indeed been found. There was a 
corollary to this observation: that an “expert operator” (or at 
least an experienced one) seemed to be necessary for a CoV 
type optimization code like DUKSUP. Whereas a steepest de-
scent or comparable optimization technique which was more 
forgiving might be more conducive to faster acquisition of the 
requisite skills necessary to master its operation. The former 
might be attractive to a federal agency with a longer retention 
period staff, while the latter might be more attractive to a pri-
vate sector organization where a nimble, market-driven staffing 
capability is held in higher regard.  
The following is a brief acknowledgement of the contempo-
rary 3D trajectory simulation and optimization codes which 
were contemporaries of DUKSUP, with which “shooting 
matches” and interaction at the P, T, & G working groups were 
regular features of launch planning activities. No attempt is 
made here to compare performance (speed, accuracy, ease of 
use, etc.) of these codes since that would be a function of the 
problem, starting guesses, consistent maturities of the codes, 
and capabilities of their mainframe platforms (at the very least). 
What could be asserted, however, is that the following three or-
ganizations’ codes (together with LeRC’s DUKSUP) repre-
sented the primary, high fidelity, expendable launch vehicle 
trajectory design and optimization computer programs in the 
U.S. from the late 1960s through the mid-1990s. 
12.2 TRAJEX 
TRAJEX was the 3D trajectory optimization code developed 
and used by General Dynamics (now Lockheed Martin) corpora-
tion, and the code LeRC staff had the most interaction with com-
paring results. However, no published sources could be found in 
the open literature documenting this code. It is believed to be 
based on the early Atlas booster ballistic (constant gravity) code11 
(thus must date back to at least the mid-1950s). It was generally 
acknowledged during the period of GD’s working with the LeRC 
(1963 to 1998) that TRAJEX used some type of Steepest Descent 
optimization technique. Good agreement with DUKSUP and 
TRAJEX output was the norm. TRAJEX was continually corre-
lated to and corrected based on post-flight actuals, which in turn 
was used to calibrate DUKSUP. A brief reference to the code can 
be found in GD-internal documentation (Ref. 11).  
11 Spurlock, O.F., personal recollection, NASA LeRC (ret.), 2014. 
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12.3 POST 
Program to Optimize Space Trajectories (POST) was the 3D 
trajectory optimization code developed and used by Martin 
Marietta (now Lockheed Martin) Corporation. Built in the 1970 
time frame, it was originally intended for Space Shuttle trajec-
tory simulation and optimization. It was adopted and used for 
expendable launch vehicle applications, including Titan IIIE. 
Optimization techniques available: primarily the Accelerated 
Projected Gradient method (a combination of the Rosen’s Pro-
jected Gradient Method and Davidson’s Variable Metric 
Method for Unconstrained Optimization). It could also call in-
dividually: Steepest Descent, Conjugate Gradients, and Da-
vidson’s Method of Optimization (Ref. 26). 
12.4 GTS 
Generalized Trajectory Simulation (GTS) was the 3D trajec-
tory optimization code developed and used by The Aerospace 
Corporation. Built in 1970 timeframe as well, The Aerospace 
Corporation used GTS to perform their mission assurance and 
technical advisement duties (i.e., they were the ‘corporate 
memory’ for the USAF) to their client USAF/Space Division 
(Los Angeles AFS). GTS used a Reduced Gradient Algorithm, 
where finite difference gradients were computed, and a quasi-
Newton update was used to satisfy the imposed constraints 
(Ref. 27). This code was their primary trajectory design and op-
timization tool in support of the USAF vehicles such as Titan 
II/III/IV, Atlas, Delta, and their various upper stages (Ref. 28) 
In a shooting match performed with DUKSUP in 1987, results 
were in reasonable agreement (within ~30 lb to GSO for Titan 
IV/Centaur.)12 The combined USAF/Space Division-The Aer-
ospace Corporation organizations were the military analogue to 
NASA LeRC (where launch vehicle management and technical 
roles were combined). 
13.0 Conclusions 
This paper was intended to be a history of the development 
and use of a Calculus of Variations trajectory optimization code 
we called DUKSUP. It is not an attempt to document the code. 
Because of the constraints existent at the time of development, 
documenting it would be a formidable and perhaps impossible 
task, and probably be intelligible only to the developer. Since 
the developer was not hired to write a code, but to do analysis, 
and the problems became more and more complex with time, it 
was probably not feasible to provide a code developer with a 
set of requirements that would allow the developer to efficiently 
formulate an architecture that was flexible enough to attack the 
problems as they developed over the 30 years of use of the code. 
The coder would also have to develop an understanding of the 
CoV derivations with an appreciation of what future problems 
might require. The developer/user also had the advantage of 
having developed simpler but similar codes that provided expe-
rience with solving the two point boundary value problem.  
Though it is tempting to focus largely on the technical ac-
complishments of this code, the larger picture must be kept in 
mind. Consider the aggregate of unprecedented national accom-
plishments that DUKSUP enabled. A great many of the most 
outstanding interplanetary missions were launched with the 
critical assistance of DUKSUP. Indeed, NASA Headquarters’ 
program management, not just the Lewis Research Center’s 
leadership, trusted the results of the code and the people’s judg-
ment who ran it enough to make critical payload performance 
commitments to mission programs typically valued in the 
$100’s M. Not once did NASA ever have to reduce a DUKSUP-
generated/LeRC-determined payload commitment. These guar-
antees by the LeRC Center Director, usually years before the 
launches, were used by the payloads to design and build their 
spacecraft. As was shown in Figure 22, these missions included 
Viking, Voyager, Pioneer Venus, and Cassini. The commercial 
viability of providers such as Intelsat rested on the certainty that 
DUKSUP’s predictions were correct and that the judgment of 
LeRC executives with regard to margins was sound. Recalling 
one such episode by a retired LeRC senior executive, “I espe-
cially remember how concerned Frank and I were on making 
the commitment to Viking, the highest national priority robotic 
mission ever at the time. We put a lot of sweat into that commit-
ment number. In the end, Frank was never wrong; we always 
were able to deliver what he promised. Millions upon millions 
of dollars rode on what he said, as well as the Lewis reputa-
tion.”13 Only one correction should be made to this quote; 
where the last sentence should read, ‘…100’s upon 100’s of 
millions of dollars…’ 
The mission design philosophy at the NASA Lewis Research 
Center during the years of its leadership of launch vehicle pro-
jects (1963 to 1998) recognized the efficacy of extracting all of 
the payload capability available through trajectory optimization 
(Ref. 8). All this analysis was done in support of that project 
philosophy to always know the best possible performance. The 
critical value of this philosophy was repeatedly demonstrated 
over more than 35 years and 119 launches during LeRC’s ten-
ure leading NASA’s unmanned launch vehicle programs for the 
Intermediate class (Atlas/Centaur) and Large class (Titan 
IIIE/IV). DUKSUP was the major LeRC computer code which 
enabled this modus operandi—and many missions have reaped 
the rewards of it. 
12 Williams, C.H., personal recollection, USAF/Space Divi-
sion/CLVD, Los Angeles AFS, 1987. 
13 Nieberding, J.J., personal recollection, NASA LeRC (ret.), 2014. 
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Appendix 
The question sometimes arose, “How did the program get 
its name?” The lead author had a professor in college who was 
notorious for transcribing long mathematical derivations dur-
ing lectures, only to stop just before the critical point in the 
derivation. He would then proclaim to the students, ‘The rest 
is as easy as duck soup.’ He would end the class without 
providing the last parts of the solution. This expression was 
adopted ironically as the name for the code, shortened to six 
characters, which was the limit for variable and subroutine 
names in FORTRAN at that time. For everyone except Frank, 
DUKSUP’s operation and the solutions it discovered were 
rarely easy to understand. 
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